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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction  
 
1. Evaluation of Public Policies 
For centuries, policy makers implemented public policies without any evidence 
that their programs would work. In general, little thought was given to the 
potential adverse effects of such policies and whether the results sought could 
be achieved more efficiently by other means. However, government 
representatives, funding agencies and the general public have begun to question 
whether their interventions actually achieve the desired goals (Gaarder and 
Briceño, 2010). The electorate, who in casting their vote implicitly expect elected 
officials to act in their interests, have begun to question whether their taxes are 
being well spent. In recent decades, public policy has come under greater 
scrutiny and the results of the evaluations conducted are now instrumental in 
shaping the political agenda.  
Public policies can be defined as formal decisions or plans of action that 
have been undertaken by, or which involve, a state entity, e.g. a ministry or a 
state government (adapted from Richards and Smith, 2002). They often make 
up programs with specific goals that have been formalized in government 
documents. Ideally, subsequent policy evaluations are also “an integral part of 
the policy making process, in which policy formulation and evaluation are linked 
in an iterative process of policy evolution” (Bachtler et al., 2000, p.43). 
With the increasing availability of data and broadening access to 
government data bases, applied economists have begun to look at other 
disciplines and have adopted causal evaluation methods that go beyond mere 
correlations. Some of these techniques, e.g. differences-in-differences or 
regression discontinuity designs, provide accurate impact evaluations and have 
become standard tools for empirical researchers. Technological advances have 
also contributed to this development and as computing power continues to 
increase, new methods are emerging for the analysis of big data.  
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Specific policy evaluation studies, such as those presented in the chapters 
making up this thesis, analyze “whether the changes in well-being are indeed 
due to the program intervention and not to other factors” (Khandker et al., 
2010, p. 7). To do so, most evaluation approaches rely on quantitative methods 
of analysis that consider periods before and after a policy or a program are 
introduced. 
Policy analysis began in the late nineteenth century with a movement led 
by Woodrow Wilson, a Princeton scholar and U.S. President. The aim of this 
movement was to achieve positive net benefits from the implementation of 
government policies. However, it was not until the 1960s that policy analysis 
became a regular method for determining the effectiveness of US government 
programs (Bellinger, 2015). The good case practice of analyzing the 
effectiveness of government programs subsequently found recognition beyond 
U.S. borders and started to be adopted in many countries.  
In Europe, policy evaluations have become an important element of 
policy culture at both national and regional levels. In the UK, Germany, Sweden 
and the Netherlands, there is an established tradition (dating back to the 1970s) 
of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of policies across different levels 
of government (Bachtler et al., 2000). According to Bel (2018), the countries of 
Northern Europe have followed an Aristotelian line of reasoning in the sense 
that “experience, the observation of nature, is the base upon which we build our 
ideas”. As such, these countries have preferred to rely on the evidence derived 
from policy analyses rather than satisfying themselves with the simple intentions 
of policy makers. With the creation of the European Union and the 
requirements introduced by the European Structural Fund, other member 
countries have begun to evaluate policies in order to comply with established 
norms so that today the culture of policy evaluation has set down roots in most 
countries of Europe.  
As Alzúa et al. (2013) report, impact evaluations have also found 
acceptance in Latin America with an increasing number of evaluations being 
conducted each year (see Figure 1.1). However, as Figure 1.2 shows, most policy 
evaluations using causal techniques have been concentrated in just a few 
countries: Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru. Alzúa et al. 
(2013) highlight that most of these impact evaluations have been undertaken on 
social protection policies, followed by education, microfinance and active labor 
market policies. 
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Figure 1.1: Number of Impact Evaluations in Latin America, 1995-2011 
Source: Based on data from Alzúa et al. (2013). 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Number of Policy Evaluations by country during 1995-2011 
Source: Based on data from Alzúa et al. (2013).  
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The role of public policy analyses and impact evaluations has grown in 
relevance in the 21st century. Having realized the importance of analyzing the 
efficacy and efficiency of government programs, developing countries have 
increased the number of evaluations they conduct, as they catch up in this regard 
with their more developed counterparts. However, the institutions that evaluate 
policies are still very much in the process of being created. For this reason, 
academic policy evaluations, such as those presented in the chapters making up 
this dissertation, remain of vital importance.  
 
2. Why Public Policies in Mexico? 
Mexico is a 1.23 trillion USD1 economy with a population of 124 million people 
in 2016. According to data from the World Bank, the size of Mexico’s economy 
(at constant U.S. Dollar and at purchasing power parity), places it 15th in the 
world rankings, just behind Spain, Australia and South Korea and ahead of such 
countries as Turkey, Indonesia and the Netherlands. Mexico has a privileged 
geographical location, lying south of the world’s largest economy, and it enjoys 
access to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, providing it with excellent trading 
conditions. The country also has abundant natural resources, which are 
important for tourism, agricultural production, and oil and natural gas 
extraction.   
The country’s economy is dominated by services (63.4% share), but its 
industrial sector remains important (32.2%) (CIA, 2017). After joining NAFTA, 
the Mexican manufacturing industries initiated a period of intense growth. 
Today, Mexico and Brazil are considered the two main economic engines of 
Latin America. Mexico has also been a member of the OECD since 1994.  
Mexico ranks as the 13th largest exporting nation in the world. The 
country has taken advantage of its privileged geographical location and signed 
ten free-trade agreements with 45 countries (90% of its trade). It is also a 
member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). Via these 
agreements, Mexico has access to a potential market of over one billion 
consumers and 60% of the world’s GDP. Mexico’s most important trading 
partner is the U.S., capturing around 81% of Mexican exports, followed by 
Canada (2.8%), China (1.4%) and Germany (1.1%).  
                                                          
1 2010 constant U.S. Dollar at Purchasing Power Parity 
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Over the years, Mexico has received praise for the reforms it has 
implemented, although key areas for further development, most notably 
security, remain (Friedman, 2016). For example, The Economist (2012) highlights 
Mexico’s importance as a trading partner for the U.S., while drawing attention 
to continuing problems of security and violence in many areas of the country. 
Mexican industry has experienced significant growth and many car 
manufacturers have chosen the country as a location for their assembly plants 
(Economist, 2015). According to Goldman Sachs (2007), Mexico “appears to 
have both the potential and conditions to rival the current major economies”. 
Given these economic trends and recent economic reforms, the professional 
services firm PWC expects Mexico to be among the ‘Top 10’ economies by 
2050 (Hawksworth et al., 2017). 
Figure 1.3: Evolution of Mexican GDP per capita (2010 at PPP) and real 
GDP growth, 1996-2016 
                        
Source: Based on data from the World Bank. 
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As Figure 1.3 shows, Mexico presents a positive trend in its GDP per 
capita. However, it also highlights the fact that the financial crisis of 2008-2009 
led to a major economic setback. Although recovery was quick, various 
problems accentuated by the crisis remain: low wages, high underemployment, 
increased poverty and inequitable income distribution. 
Despite the positive signs, Mexico remains a developing country with 
high poverty rates and low wages. In terms of poverty, the World Bank reports 
that Mexico has 3.8 million people living below the international poverty line, 
1.90 USD per day, and around 15 million people living on 3.20 USD per day 
(figures in 2011 USD at PPP). In terms of inequality, the country has a Gini 
Index of 0.482 and the income share held by the highest 20% is about 53.5% 
(CIA, 2017).  
Developing countries, inevitably, face similar problems and often share 
the economic characteristics presented by Mexico. However, it is these features 
that make Mexico such an interesting country in which to conduct public policy 
analyses and the Mexican case can also offer solutions to the problems that 
afflict other countries. The specific context in which the policies analyzed in this 
thesis have been implemented is the following: 
1. Mexico City is one of the world’s mega cities with an estimated 
population of about 20 million people in its metropolitan area (2010). 
Gentrification, and the fast pace at which the city is growing, means 
people have to commute over considerable distances each day and 
spend a considerable amount of time in doing so. The city has serious 
congestion problems exacerbating air pollution in the urban area. 
Congestion in the city is caused by the enormous number of private 
cars, a deteriorating fleet of public buses and the absence of any 
effective regulations. High pollution levels in major urban areas can 
affect the health of the inhabitants and can be hazardous, especially 
for children, the weak and the elderly. Survey reports show that 
10.8% of urban inhabitants would be willing to switch from private 
to public transportation if public transportation was better (in terms 
of quality and availability) and 10.2% would consider a modal change 
if fuel prices continue to rise (CESOP, 2017a). 
 
2. Mexico has also become a major drug-producing and transit nation. 
Estimated to be the world's third largest producer of opium and 
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marihuana, Mexico constitutes the main supply route for illicit drugs 
being transported from South America to the US (CIA, 2017). Major 
drug cartels, generically referred to as drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) control drug production, transport and distribution. At the 
end of 2006/beginning of 2007, the government sent federal police 
forces, the navy and the military to crack down on these drug 
criminals. Since then, the country has seen a marked rise in crime 
rates, including homicides, kidnappings, and robberies. DTOs have 
infiltrated local police forces and corrupted local and, on occasions, 
state politicians. Despite this wave of violence, Mexicans continue to 
believe (CESOP, 2016) that the navy and the military are among the 
most trusted government institutions, while most citizens express 
their approval of the continued use of military and navy forces to 
fight DTOs. 
 
3. Minimum wages in Mexico have decreased in real terms over decades 
reaching a level at which these workers are unable to afford a 
minimum basket. Indeed, between 1980 and 2014, the value of the 
real minimum wage was eroded by almost 70%, leaving them 
considerably worse off. Not only is Mexico’s minimum wage the 
lowest in the OECD, it is also the lowest among Latin American 
countries (Moreno-Brid, 2014). According to the Mexican Statistics 
Institute (INEGI), in 2015 about 7 million workers earned up to one 
minimum wage (about 0.90 USD per hour), and 13 million earned 
between one and two minimum wages. Moreover, Mexico, like many 
other developing countries has a split labor market, divided into 
formal and informal labor. The share of informal labor has been 
reported to reach up to 60%. CESOP (2017b) reports that 96% of 
citizens surveyed consider a minimum wage as being insufficient to 
live on, while 68% think it should be raised. 
Mexico plays an important role in the world economy and expectations 
regarding its development are high. Conditions in the country with regard to 
transport, violence and wages, and the features it has in common with other 
developing countries, mean it is especially interesting to analyze the policies 
being implemented in Mexico. 
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3. Institutions and Policy Analysis in Mexico 
As discussed, several Latin American countries have undertaken impact 
evaluations of the policies they implement. Indeed, institutions often perform 
different evaluations of the same policy but at different stages, e.g. a process 
evaluation and an impact evaluation (CAF, 2015, p.198).  
As Jacob et al. (2015) explain, the degree of institutionalization of policy 
evaluation varies greatly across countries. However, these authors speak of the 
benefits of an evaluation culture that can foster openness, transparency and 
accountability among political actors and bureaucrats. Likewise, Julio Frenk, the 
former Mexican Health Minister, has highlighted the importance of an 
evaluation culture: “Both politically, in terms of being accountable to those who 
fund the system, and also ethically, in terms of making sure that you make the 
best use possible of available resources, evaluation is absolutely critical” (Oxman 
et al., 2010, p. 427). 
Mexico’s central government has extensive experience in public policy 
planning. The 1982 Planning Law (Ley de Planeación) requires that national 
objectives be outlined and its priorities be defined. The weakest feature of 
Mexico’s policy planning scheme lies in the operative area, i.e. while national 
objectives are well defined, it is not clear how they should be achieved. While 
sectoral planning is usually determined for an administrative period, no annual 
objectives are fixed (García-López and García Moreno, 2010). 
The strengths of Mexico’s policy making lie in the fields of financial 
management, auditing and procurement, while the country’s planning, 
monitoring and evaluation stages employ sound methodologies. However, 
planning and budgeting stages are not well coordinated with monitoring and 
evaluation stages. The weakest area is that of budget allocation based on the 
results and the efficacy of the policies implemented (García-López and García 
Moreno, 2010). 
For some years now, Mexico has been engaged in a process of 
institutional construction that has facilitated good policy analysis. Created in 
1983, the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) has been responsible for generating official 
statistics and in 2008 it became autonomous from the government.  
In the early 2000s, during the presidency of Vicente Fox, a new 
information transparency law was passed. This law led to the creation of 
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Mexico’s Freedom of Information Institute (Instituto Federal de Acceso a la 
Información, IFAI, later rebranded as INAI). Anybody can request information 
and data (assuming they exist) from this institution about all government offices. 
Later, in 2007, access to government information became a fundamental right 
for all Mexicans and was anchored in the constitution.  
Mexico has a relatively short tradition of analyzing public policies 
compared to the longer experience of the U.S. and various European countries. 
While most policy analyses have been made at universities, the Mexican 
government has recognized the importance of independent evaluations of the 
efficacy of public interventions. In 2004, the General Social Development Law 
was passed, which recognized the need to “establish mechanisms for evaluation 
and monitoring of the programs and actions of national social development 
policies” (Article 1, Point VIII, General Social Development Law 2004). 
With this law, the National Council for the Evaluation of Social 
Development Policies (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo 
Social, CONEVAL) was created in 2004. Although this institution is coordinated 
by the Ministry of Social Development (Sectretaría de Desarrollo Social, 
SEDESOL), it reports to an executive board of independent academics and is 
responsible for the measurement of poverty, providing multidimensional 
analyses (Gaarder and Briceño, 2010). This multidimensional focus for policy 
evaluation covers all of the following stages: design, strategic planning, 
operation, coverage and targeting, perception of beneficiaries and results (CAF, 
2015, p.198). The role of CONEVAL, however, is restricted to social 
development polices only. 
More recently in 2015, the Center for Research and Teaching in 
Economics (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE), together with the 
National Council for Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y 
Tecnología, CONACYT), founded the National Public Policy Laboratory 
(Laboratorio Nacional de Políticas Públicas, LNPP). This institution has been set up 
to simulate policy interventions and help in the evaluation of policies 
implemented in different parts of the country. 
The creation of institutions to evaluate policies in Mexico is cause for 
optimism. However, the policy areas subject to such evaluation need to be 
widened beyond that of social programs. Indeed, there is still a marked absence 
of policy evaluations in fields beyond that of social development. In the hope 
of going some way to rectify this, the present dissertation undertakes an analysis 
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of three different policies implemented in Mexico in the first years of the 21st 
century.  
 
4. Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation undertakes the analysis, in three separate chapters, of three 
specific public policies implemented in Mexico. Specifically, it comprises: (1) an 
impact evaluation of the introduction of the first bus rapid transit route on air 
pollution in Mexico City; (2) an assessment of the effects of the Mexican ‘Drug 
War’ on state economic growth; and (3) an analysis of how a territorial policy 
change in minimum wages affected employment in certain Mexican regions. The 
objective is to analyze each of these policies individually using modern 
econometric techniques and to determine the effects and consequences of these 
policies.  
In chapter two, I analyze the introduction of the first route of the bus 
rapid transit (BRT) network in Mexico City in 2005. Given the congestion and 
pollution problems the city faced, the government introduced the BRT – 
naming it Metrobus – in an attempt to reduce congestion on one of the most 
heavily congested roads in the city. The impact of BRT on air pollution is 
believed to be positive, given the results of analyses that provide side-by-side 
comparisons of the old buses and new BRT units. However, these studies fail 
to consider the replacement effects of old buses and do not study specific 
pollutants at the molecular level. For this analysis, I use data from automatic air 
quality monitoring stations distributed across the metropolitan area and 
complement these with information from INEGI, the city’s water systems 
commission CONAGUA, and the atmospheric monitoring network. The 
differences-in-differences approach I use for the analysis assigns monitoring 
stations into treatment and control groups based on their distance from the BRT 
corridor. The results show that the introduction of the BRT reduced the 
concentration of three out of the four pollutants analyzed: carbon monoxide 
(CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and airborne particulate matter with aerodynamic 
diameter of 10 µm (PM10). The results also show themselves to be robust to the 
use of a regression discontinuity design.  
This chapter has been published as Evaluation of the impact of Bus Rapid 
Transit on air pollution in Mexico City in Transport Policy, 63, pp. 209-220. 
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In chapter three, I assess the economic effects of the policy commonly 
known as the Mexican ‘Drug War’ implemented by the federal government. The 
policy aimed at cracking down on the activities of drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) by employing the military, the navy and federal police forces. The effect 
of the public expenditure shock, in the form of an aggressive confrontation with 
the DTOs, had unintended consequences. The capture of high ranking drug 
lords upset the power equilibrium between the DTOs and a war broke out 
between drug cartels. This war, together with the battle waged with government 
forces, led to many casualties (with many civilians being caught in the cross-
fire). To exacerbate matters, the DTOs diversified their criminal operations and 
became involved in kidnappings, extortion rackets, robberies, etc. Government 
policy, which involved increased military expenditure, as well as the unexpected 
increase in violence and crime, may have had unintentional effects on the 
economy that, to date, have not been explored in the literature. Using state-level 
data from INEGI and other sources, including the government’s budget figures, 
I employ a dynamic panel data regression to analyze the effects that crime 
variables and military budgets had on state economic growth. The results show 
that crime had significant negative effects on economic growth, while military 
budgets show positive effects.  
In chapter four, I investigate the employment effects of the 2012 
minimum wage territorial policy change that reduced the number of minimum 
wage areas from three to just two. The minimum wage in the area that 
disappeared was increased to be on a par with that fixed for the area with the 
highest minimum wage. For my analysis, I use data from the INEGI’s labor 
survey ENOE. The differences-in-differences analysis shows a negative and 
significant impact on employment. When disentangling formal and informal 
labor, the negative effects of the policy are apparent on formal employment but 
not on informal labor. The analysis also points to a marked impact of the 
minimum wage increase on male workers. Female workers, however, appear 
unaffected. For many years, the government has been undecided as to whether 
to increase minimum wages above inflation, fearing, among other effects, the 
consequences for employment. This chapter provides information to policy 
makers regarding how additional minimum wage increases are likely to affect 
employment in the short run. 
The research reported here aims to obtain sufficient evidence of the 
impact of these three policies so that policy makers can be better informed of 
their consequences. The results presented in chapters two to four should also 
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provide insights to other developing countries with similar economic 
characteristics and with similar problems to those in Mexico. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Evaluation of the Impact of Bus Rapid Transit on Air 
Pollution in Mexico City 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Mexico City’s bus rapid transit (BRT) network, Metrobus, was introduced in an 
attempt to reduce congestion, increase city transport efficiency and cut air 
polluting emissions. In June 2005, the first BRT line in the metropolitan area 
began service. We use the differences-in-differences technique to make the first 
quantitative assessment of the policy impact of a BRT system on air polluting 
emissions. The air pollutants considered are carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen 
oxides (NOX), particulate matter of less than 10 µm (PM10), and sulfur dioxide 
(SO2). The ex-post analysis uses real field data from air quality monitoring 
stations for periods before and after BRT implementation. Results show that 
BRT constitutes an effective environmental policy, reducing emissions of CO, 
NOX, and PM10. 
 
Keywords:  Bus Rapid Transit, Differences-in-Differences, 
Environmental Policy Evaluation, Public Transport, 
Urban Air Pollution 
JEL Codes:   Q51, Q58, R41, R48 
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1. Introduction 
In the literature of environmental and transport economics, road transport is 
widely considered one of the main sources of air pollution. More specifically, a 
large fraction of GHG emissions and air pollutants are recognized as being 
derived from road traffic: “In 2004, transport accounted for almost a quarter of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from global energy use. Three-quarters of 
transport-related emissions are from road traffic” (Woodcock et al., 2009, p. 2).  
The source of emissions coming from road transport is different 
depending on the area. While freight transport is an important source of 
polluting emissions in interurban areas, private vehicles are considered one of 
the main sources of emissions in urban areas. Moreover, pollution levels are 
particularly high in urban areas that suffer severe levels of traffic congestion 
such as the metropolitan area of Mexico City. Conventional road transport in 
metropolitan areas produces a series of pollutant emissions, which in high 
concentrations represent a hazard for the inhabitants. The most usual pollutants 
are particulate matter of different size fractions (PM10 and PM2.5), carbon 
monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOX), and carbon 
dioxide (CO2).  
Urban road transit can be broken down into different sectors, with one 
of the most relevant being that of public transport. Urban buses emit relatively 
high levels of CO, NOX, PM10, and CO2. However, due to the use of cleaner, 
better quality fuels and to stricter regulations on road traffic emissions, the net 
air quality impact of buses can be positive if vehicles are replaced periodically. 
This is particularly true if cities adopt electric vehicles and this energy is 
generated from renewable sources. 
Public transport systems, such as subways and light rail networks, are 
emission friendly transport options (compared to private combustion engine 
vehicles) that are able to transport huge numbers of people on daily basis. The 
downside of these modes of transportation, however, is the enormous initial 
investment they require, the rigidity of their services and the GHG emissions 
generated by their electricity source. Most governments operate under 
considerable budget constraints so that building or expanding local public 
transport infrastructure requires massive investment, while construction is not 
always feasible owing to the nature of the local geography.  
In the last few decades, governments have sought alternatives that are 
similarly effective but at the same time more affordable. One such option is the 
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Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system, a high-quality bus service with a similar 
performance to that of a subway, but provided at a fraction of the construction 
cost (Cervero, 1998). Many countries around the world such as Brazil, China, 
South Africa and Turkey have adopted BRT systems. The main factors in their 
favor are the low initial investment costs (especially compared to a subway line), 
low maintenance costs, operating flexibility, and the fact that they provide a 
rapid, reliable service (Deng and Nelson, 2011). If a BRT line is unable to 
capture the projected transport demand, or if the usual route is under 
maintenance, the line can easily be rerouted. 
The literature addressing the impact of BRT on air quality does not 
quantify the reduction in concentrations of the different pollutants. Most 
assessments are qualitative studies, computational simulations or take the form 
cost-benefit analyses that fail to provide details about individual pollutant levels. 
Our research seeks to address this gap in the literature. We study the impact of 
the BRT introduction in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area on the 
concentration of different air pollutants. The contributions of this paper are, as 
such, easily identifiable: a) to provide a rigorous quantification of the short-term 
impact on air quality of the introduction of a BRT network in the Metropolitan 
Area of Mexico City; b) to add to the few analyses to date that employ actual 
field data in their evaluations of public transport policy; and c) to employ the 
econometric-based method of differences-in-differences to analyze the 
environmental impact of a public transportation system like BRT. 
 
2. Related Literature 
2.1 Studies on Polluting Emission Reductions 
Several studies have examined the impact of pollutants and report the potential 
effects for health. PM10 and PM2.5 have been linked with a decrease in 
respiratory capacity, aggravating asthmatic conditions, and with severe heart and 
lung damage (WHO, 2001). Nitrogen oxides (NOX) affect the respiratory 
system, Sulfur dioxide (SO2) can worsen respiratory or cardiovascular diseases, 
and carbon monoxide (CO) is poisonous and in high concentrations can lead to 
unconsciousness and even death (Neidell, 2004; Schlenker and Walker, 2011). 
The effects of alleviating traffic congestion on infant health are analyzed in 
Currie and Walker (2011), who show that a reduction in congestion increases 
the health and development of infants (see also Kampa and Castanas, 2008; 
Wilhelm et al., 2008; and Lleras-Muney, 2010). 
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Many governments have introduced policies to reduce the emissions 
generated by their mobility services. Building up and expanding public transport 
infrastructure is a common strategy undertaken to reduce travel times, road 
congestion and polluting emissions. The study by Chen and Whalley (2012) 
looks at the introduction of Urban Rail Transit – the Metro – in Taipei and finds 
a reduction of between 5 and 15% in CO emissions. Topalovic et al. (2012) 
analyses the case of Hamilton in the US and points out that Light Rail Transit 
reduces emissions by displacing automobiles to alternative roads. An emission 
comparison between different transport modes, such as LRT and automobiles, 
is done by Shapiro et al. (2002), showing the benefits of public transport 
opposite to private car use. Similarly, Puchalsky (2005) also estimates lower 
emissions coming from electric forms of urban transport (LRT) compared to 
combustion engines such as the ones used by BRT units. 
An alternative policy for abating emissions from road traffic is the 
introduction of maximum speed limits on highways or in certain metropolitan 
areas. Many studies have examined the impact of such policies by employing a 
vast range of analytical techniques. In this way, we find Gonçalves et al. (2008), 
who report modest reductions of polluting emissions in Barcelona; Keuken at 
al. (2010), who find a substantial reduction in polluting levels in the Netherlands; 
and, Keller at al. (2008), who estimate a 4% reduction in NOX due to this policy 
in Switzerland. An alternative way of evaluating the impact of a policy on 
pollution levels is to measure the effect ex-post using field data. However, few 
studies of this type have been reported to date. Exceptions include Bel and 
Rosell (2013) and Bel et al. (2015) on the impact of an 80km/h speed limit and 
a variable speed limit policy in the metro-area of Barcelona. They report that a 
variable speed limit was much more effective, reducing NOX and PM10 
emissions by 7.7–17.1% and 14.5–17.3% respectively. This suggests that 
reducing congestion (for which variable speed limit is a useful tool) is more 
effective than enforcing a fixed maximum speed limit. Another study that uses 
field data is that by Van Benthem (2015), who analyses speed limits on the U.S. 
West Coast highways, and concludes that the optimal speed, considering costs 
and benefits, is about 88km/h (55 mph) and that increasing the speed would 
increase CO, NOX, and O2 levels.  
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2.2 Bus Rapid Transit and Air Pollution 
Bus Rapid Transit –BRT– is a relatively new mode of public transportation that 
has found broad acceptance in developing countries since the early 1990s. By 
the end of 2016, 207 cities around the world had adopted some form of BRT. 
We find prominent examples in Bogotá, Curitiba, Guangzhou, Jakarta, and 
Istanbul. Latin America is seen as the epicenter of the global BRT movement 
(Cervero, 2013) with over 60 cities using BRT, moving about 20 million people 
each day; that is, 62% of the global demand for BRT services. Above all, cities 
in Brazil (34), Mexico (12) and Colombia (7) have led the rapid growth of BRT 
networks in the region. BRT has also developed in Europe and the U.S. Over 
50 cities in Europe provide this service to an average of 2 million people daily. 
BRT systems exist in 18 cities in the US, transporting an average of almost half 
a million people daily (see http://brtdata.org/) for figures and statistics on BRT 
cities. 
A key feature of BRT is that it acts not only as a transport policy, but 
also forms part of a country’s environmental policy. In this latter regard, it needs 
to be borne in mind that old buses are being replaced by modern vehicles run 
on cleaner fuels, while the introduction of BRT lines should also reduce 
congestion. According to Cervero (2013, p. 19), BRT is ‘likely’ to have net 
benefits regarding emissions: “BRT generally emits less carbon dioxide than 
LRT [light rail train] vehicles due to the use of cleaner fuels”. Cervero and 
Murakami (2010) consider that attracting former motorists to BRT can reduce 
vehicle kilometers traveled and thus polluting emissions. In addition, Bubeck et 
al. (2014) suggest that a better integrated public transport system would attract 
higher passenger volumes resulting in lower emissions. 
The reduction in emission levels thanks to the introduction of BRT 
systems is noticeable. In Bogotá’s TransMilenio, Hidalgo et al. (2013) estimate 
health-cost savings from reduced emissions following the completion of 
TransMilenio’s first two phases at US$114 million over a 20-year period, based 
on a rough computation of data. They calculate that about 8% of total benefits 
can be attributed to air pollution and traffic accident savings (reductions in 
associated illnesses and deaths). However, the authors do not use real field data 
to quantify the pollution-reduction benefits. After the implementation of 
TransMilenio, the government of Bogotá reported a reduction of 43% in SO2 
emissions, a reduction of 18% in NOx, and a 12% decline in particulate matter 
(Turner et. al. 2012). Indeed, in Bogotá, the buses displaced by the BRT were 
reallocated to the urban edge and smaller surrounding townships, leading 
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Echeverry et al. (2005) to argue that BRT may not have reduced the problem of 
polluting emissions but simply displaced it to other areas.  
A study attempting to directly measure the air pollution impact of BRT 
is the one by Salehi et al. (2016), in which the authors study the development of 
different pollutants before and after the introduction of a BRT corridor in 
Tehran. Their measurements show a reduction of 5.8% for PM10, 6.7% for CO, 
6.7% for NOx and 12.5% for SO2. Their approach however does not consider 
the existence of a counterfactual, which would give their estimations broader 
validity. Using data from five air quality measuring stations during the time of 
the BRT introduction in Jakarta, Budi-Nugroho, et al. (2011) find a reduction 
of PM10 and Ozone levels and argue that this decline is linked to the modal shift 
of commuters from private modes of transport to the BRT. By comparing 
polluting emissions from light rail trains and BRT in the UK, Hodgson et al. 
(2013) find that BRT produces lower PM10 emissions, but higher NOx 
emissions.   
The analysis of historical trends of energy demand, air pollutants and 
GHG emissions attributable to passenger vehicles commuting in Mexico City’s 
metro-area done by Chávez-Baeza and Sheinbaum-Pardo (2014), reported that 
the primary sources of small particle matter are road passenger transport 
vehicles. According to in-vehicle measurements by Shiohara et al. (2005), 
carcinogenic risks caused by micro-buses were much higher than those caused 
by buses and the metro. In a related study, Gómez-Perales et al. (2004) measured 
(in-vehicle) commuters’ exposure to PM2.5, CO and benzene in micro-buses, 
buses and the metro in Mexico City during morning and evening rush hours. 
They reported that pollution levels inside the micro-bus units presented the 
highest concentrations for all the pollutants during rush hours. Wöhrnschimmel 
et al. (2008) compared micro-bus, regular bus and BRT unit emissions in Mexico 
City. Based on in-vehicle emission measurements, they concluded that 
Metrobus units were the least polluting of the three options given that the buses 
are newer, more efficient and run on diesel instead of regular fuel. 
The studies analyzing the impact of BRT on polluting emissions are 
scarce. In order to have a good overview of the methods used and the results 
obtained in these we summarize these aspect in Table 2.1, below. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature by providing a robust quantification of the 
short-term impact on air quality of the BRT network in the metropolitan area 
of Mexico City. We employ actual field data in our evaluation, and use the quasi-
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experimental method of differences-in-differences to analyze the environmental 
impact of the Bus Rapid Transit System in Mexico. 
 
Table 2.1: Overview of studies analyzing the impact of Bus Rapid Transit on 
Polluting Emissions 
Authors Place and year  Method Outcome 
Wöhrnschimmel 
et al. (2008) 
Mexico City  
(May - 
October 2005) 
In-vehicle 
emission 
measurements 
Reductions between 20% 
and 70% in commuters’ 
exposure to CO, benzene 
and PM2.5. No significant 
reductions in PM10 
Budi-Nugroho, 
et al. (2011) 
Jakarta  
(April, May, 
September, 
and October 
2005) 
Structural 
equation model 
combined with an 
artificial neural 
network 
Significant reduction in 
the concentration of PM10  
Hidalgo et al. 
(2013) 
Bogotá  
(1998-2006) 
Data computation 
for Cost-Benefit 
Analysis 
Positive impact on health 
due to reduced emissions 
of air pollutants 
Hodgson et al. 
(2013) 
Reading, UK 
(2011) 
Reading Urban 
Network System 
(Transit 
evaluation model) 
Compared to Light Rail 
Trains, BRT has lower 
PM10 emissions, but NOx 
emissions are higher 
Chávez-Baeza 
and Sheinbaum-
Pardo (2014) 
Mexico City  
(1990-2008) 
Estimation of 
historical trends 
using a Vehicle 
Emissions 
Scenario 
Reduction of 7% for 
PM10, 2.4% for CO, 
15.4% NOx. 
Salehi et al. 
(2016) 
Tehran  
(2011) 
Measurement of 
emissions at BRT 
stations 
Reduction of 5.8% for 
PM10, 6.7% for CO, 6.7% 
for NOx and 12.5% for 
SO2 
 
 
3. Bus Rapid Transit in Mexico City 
3.1 The Metrobus Policy 
The Mexico City Metropolitan Area is one of the most heavily populated 
metropolitan areas in the world. The estimated population in 2005 was 19.2 
million inhabitants, growing to over 20 million by 2010 (population density was 
estimated at 2560 inhabitants/km²). The city has a subtropical highland climate 
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and lies in an elevated basin at 2,240 meters above sea level. The valley is 
confined on three sides by mountain ridges (east, south, and west). Diurnal 
temperatures oscillate between 10 and 22°C, and can easily climb above 30°C 
on hot days and fall to freezing on cold winter days. Rainfall is intense from 
June to October, but it is scarce from November to May. Pollution levels are 
much higher during the dry season. Wind speed plays a critical role in the city’s 
weather and pollution levels: weak winds and the shape of the valley do not 
allow air pollutants to disperse. 
It was only until the late 20th century that authorities recognized the 
Mexico City Metropolitan Area pollution problem and started to implement 
strategic measures to reduce polluting emissions. The measures implemented 
targeted industry emissions, vehicle emissions, commuter travel distances and 
travel times, and soil erosion. Although a downward trend was achieved, CO 
levels were above safety levels on 3% of the time, NO2 on 10%, and PM10 on 
50% at least in some city areas between 1995 and 2000, while SO2 no longer 
surpassed official norm limits since 1993 (CAM, 2002).  
The most known measure was the ‘Hoy no circula’ (today you do not 
circulate) program introduced in 1989. This program is coupled with an exhaust 
monitoring program (known as ‘verificación’), such that cars that do not fulfill 
emission criteria are not allowed on the road on one particular day during the 
week depending on the last number of their license plate. Analyzing the impact 
of this program with a regression discontinuity design, Davis (2008, p. 40) 
showed that this policy is not effective, but it also “led to an increase in the total 
number of vehicles in circulation as well as a change in the composition of 
vehicles toward high-emissions vehicles”.  
On 5 November 2002, the governor of Mexico City announced an 
ambitious program to deal with the worst cases of congestion. The aim was to 
reduce commuting times and to tackle the city’s air quality problems, and several 
policies were implemented. In 2004 a few buses from the public network were 
renewed. In 2006-07 some parts of the ‘second floor’ of the inner-city highway 
Anillo Periférico were inaugurated. This helped reducing congestion in some areas, 
but the overall number of cars using both levels increased; so reduction of 
emissions was not significant. Other minor policies were introduced in 2007, 
such as a pilot project of a bicycle program. All in all, results obtained with these 
different programs and measures were modest. 
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At the heart of the 2002 program lay the introduction of a BRT 
(‘Metrobus’) system, designed to reduce traffic and air pollutant emissions. The 
intention was not to compete with existing public modes of transport; rather, 
BRT was seen as an alternative to existing options in order to reduce congestion. 
Note that, as found by Anderson (2014) for Los Angeles, congestion relief 
benefits alone may justify transit infrastructure investments. On March 2005, 
the Secretaría de Mobilidad (Mobility/Transport Secretariat, SEMOVI) oversaw 
the creation of the public entity Metrobus, with an initial operating budget of 
MXN 42.4 million pesos (USD 3.8 M in 2005). Metrobus was to be fully 
responsible for the BRT’s operation planning and its control and administration.  
The main idea underpinning the BRT system was to create an exclusive 
bus lane in which only authorized buses could operate subject to certain rules 
and criteria (schedule time, designated stops, physical dimensions of buses, and 
amount of emissions), to guarantee efficient operation. To promote the system, 
several stations had to be built to enable passengers to access the service. The 
project was implemented in 2005 with an initial investment of around USD $80 
million to build up the infrastructure (Schipper et al., 2009). The investment 
included the construction of 37 BRT stations and exclusive bus lanes and the 
introduction of new articulated buses run on conventional diesel fuel. BRT was 
first opened on Av. de los Insurgentes; the initial fleet had a size of 80 units and the 
first line in this corridor was 19.6 km long (it was extended to 28.1 km in 2008 
while the fleet grew to 98 units). BRT lanes reduced traffic congestion, as the 
measure eliminated overlapping of services with other bus lines. At the same 
time, flow in the car lanes was improved as traffic no longer had to stop 
whenever a bus or a micro-bus made a stop.  
Following the introduction of the Metrobus, 90 buses where reallocated 
to other areas on the mountain side of the city2, while 192 buses and micro-
buses were completely destroyed. In general, Micro-buses are poorly maintained 
and produce serious amounts of health-threatening gases for people. In 2004, 
61% of all minibuses in Mexico City ran on gasoline, 35% used Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG); the remaining ones ran on natural gas or diesel (GDF-
SMA, 2006). The new BRT units used modern and certified diesel technology. 
Therefore, the substitution of the old units represented an important change in 
terms of the air quality conditions in the areas adjacent to the new Metrobus 
                                                          
2 We have run the analysis excluding the air quality measuring stations close to this area, to 
avoid possible changes of our results. Coefficients remain unchanged in sign and significance. 
Results are available upon request. 
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route. One of the aims of the policy was to lower the air polluting emissions of 
public transportation, and the units operating the BRT network satisfy specific 
standards (Euro V emission standard).  
While it seems intuitive that there is less pollution because of vehicle 
substitution, it is not clear whether pollution levels in the metropolitan area have 
also been reduced. Less congestion on a particular route may induce more 
people to use it. Hence, an increase in demand may even increase pollution 
levels in a given area if a sufficient number of commuters are attracted to use it. 
According to the Metrobus office, standard commuting times have fallen from 
1 hour 30 minutes to 1 hour on the route, while passenger exposure to benzene, 
CO, and PM2.5 has fallen by up to 50 percent, compared to the figures for the 
previous bus service operating in this corridor. However, the accuracy of this 
information is questionable as these outcomes are likely to be based on 
computations from in-vehicle emission changes, rather than real field data.  
The Mexico City government monitors the air quality within its 
metropolitan area, by measuring levels of various pollutants within its network 
of automatic air quality monitoring stations distributed across the city. These 
stations have been operational during a number of years and the information is 
made publicly available. We use this information to measure the impact of the 
introduction of the Metrobus system on the concentrations of five pollutants.  
 
3.2 Mexico City’s Metrobus Network 
The number of passengers using BRT has increased over the years (see Table 
2.2) as has the size of the BRT-bus fleet. Since 2005 and the opening of the first 
line, the network has been expanded: line one was extended to the south in 
March 2008, and lines two (20 km) and three (17 km) came into operation in 
December 2008 and February 2011, respectively. At the same time, the overall 
size of the BRT fleet has grown to serve this expanding network, growing from 
80 to 98 units (following the extension of line one), and subsequently to 167 
(opening of line two) and 281 (opening of line three). In April 2012, line four 
(14 km) was inaugurated and, in November 2013, line five (10 km) was added. 
By which date the fleet had expanded to 396 units. In 2014, the Metrobus 
network transported a total of 254 million passengers, and with the expanding 
reach of the Metrobus network and the increasing number of buses required to 
operate each new line (which acts as a multiplier), passenger numbers continue 
to increase. 
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Table 2.2: Number of passengers using Mexico-City’s Metrobus Network 
Year Line 1 Line 2 Line 3 Line 4 Line 5 Total 
2005 34,720,301 0 0 0 0 34,720,301 
2006 74,218,369 0 0 0 0 74,218,369 
2007 77,652,339 0 0 0 0 77,652,053 
2008 88,840,439 963,900 0 0 0 89,804,339 
2009 93,381,006 33,753,903 0 0 0 127,134,909 
2010 98,906,091 38,009,587 0 0 0 136,915,678 
2011 112,322,116 43,192,375 31,668,509 0 0 187,183,000 
2012 122,082,471 47,364,386 39,890,301 10,982,706 0 220,319,864 
2013 124,717,045 48,005,198 40,476,438 13,586,594 3,157,914 229,943,189 
2014 127,044,608 48,946,595 43,000,735 18,572,161 21,712,834 259,276,932 
Source: Data from the Metrobus Public Information Office. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
The first part of the analysis employs the differences-in-differences method to 
facilitate the measurement of the impact of the new BRT system on polluting 
emissions. By so doing, the intention is to estimate the atmospheric 
concentration of pollutants in Mexico City between 2003 and 2007 and to assess 
the impact of the introduction of the Metrobus. 
The data panel used for this analysis is unbalanced. This characteristic of 
our panel comes from the fact that some stations were in operation from the 
beginning of the period of analysis, while other new ones were introduced at a 
later point in time, sometimes substituting older ones. On the other hand, most 
stations required maintenance at some point. The introduction or switching-off 
of the stations is exogenous and not correlated with the variables in the model. 
In the absence of a randomized trial, the method we adopt is an 
extension of the differences-in-differences estimation procedure specified as a 
two-way fixed effects model. As stated in Wooldridge (2010: 828), “the usual 
fixed effects estimator on the unbalanced panel is consistent”. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is air pollutant concentration at station i for period t, 𝛼 is a constant 
term, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time-varying control covariates that include atmospheric 
characteristics, and 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the BRT impact dummy variable to be evaluated. As 
usual in this kind of models, 𝜃𝑖 are station-specific fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 are time-
specific fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the random error. Station fixed effects control 
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for time-invariant station-specific omitted variables; time fixed effects control 
for trends around each monitoring station. 
The key parameter in this differences-in-differences approach is 𝛾, which 
measures the difference between the average change in air pollutant 
concentrations for the treatment group (stations within a radius of 10 kilometers 
around the Metrobus line) and average change in concentrations for the control 
group (stations located between 10 and 30 kilometers away from the area 
through which the Metrobus passes). Specifically, 
𝛾 =  [𝐸(𝑌𝐵| 𝐵𝑅𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝐴| 𝐵𝑅𝑇 = 1)] 
−[𝐸(𝑌𝐵| 𝐵𝑅𝑇 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑌𝐴| 𝐵𝑅𝑇 = 0)] 
(2) 
where 𝑌𝐵 and 𝑌𝐴 denote the air pollutant concentrations before and after 
Metrobus came into operation. BRT=1 and BRT=0 denote treatment and 
control group observations respectively. 
The equation for the dependent variables (CO, NOX, PM10, and SO2) is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽5𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
A basic assumption when using differences-in-differences is that the 
temporal trend in the two areas is the same in the absence of the intervention. 
If this were not the case, the impact being measured would be biased.  
In conducting the analysis, the parallel trend assumption is first tested to 
determine whether the pollutant concentration trend was parallel in the period 
prior to treatment (i.e. before policy implementation). To conduct this test, the 
data were grouped by trimester. After testing and satisfying this assumption for 
all pollutants (with the exception of PM10), we can verify that in the absence of 
intervention, the trend presented by the treated group is equal to that presented 
by the control. The evolution in pollutant levels over time is shown in graph 
form in Figure A2.1 in the Appendix. These graphs show how the treated and 
the non-treated pollutant levels behaved similarly during the pre-treatment 
period.  
The failure to satisfy the parallel trend assumption in the case of PM10 
leads to a biased impact evaluation for this particular pollutant. However, 
despite this slight upward bias, the PM10 analysis is included because of the 
importance of this pollutant. The impact evaluation of the remaining pollutants, 
however, is not biased since the parallel trends assumption is satisfied. 
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Furthermore, and as pointed out above, no major policy interventions took 
place during the period of study, giving the differences-in-differences analysis 
the required validity.  
Endogeneity is a problem that can sometimes bias an impact evaluation. 
However, the great appeal of the differences-in-differences estimation “comes 
from its simplicity as well as its potential to circumvent many of the endogeneity 
problems that typically arise when making comparisons between heterogeneous 
individuals […].” (Bertrand et al., 2004, p. 250). Moreover, the implementation 
of this policy did not respond to a sudden deterioration in air quality, but rather 
to a longstanding and persistent congestion problem. As such, potential 
endogeneity issues are not likely to affect the present policy evaluation.   
When using differences-in-differences in a panel data setting, regressions 
have to be undertaken with fixed effects: the correlation between the error 
components of station i and the explanatory variables should be different from 
zero. Closely related to this, an important assumption here is that unobservable 
variables and unobservable characteristics remain constant over time. By 
running the Hausman test and rejecting the null-hypothesis, we confirm the 
correct use of fixed effects in this panel. We test the model’s basic assumptions 
(homoscedasticity, time dependence, spatial dependence and exogeneity of 
explanatory variables). To account for first order autocorrelation, we include a 
one-period lag of the respective pollutant in each regression. By using Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors, the estimator is modified in such a way that it is robust 
to cross-section and time dependence. In this way, standard errors are also 
heteroscedasticity-consistent (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998).  
For the analysis, we considered five different models, allowing the 
treatment group to change each time. This enables us to identify a distance band 
from the BRT corridor in which pollutant levels are affected by the introduction 
of the BRT. The control group remains the same for all five models: air quality 
monitoring stations in a radius of 10 to 30 kilometers around the Metrobus 
corridor (here we consider the shortest straight-line distance between stations 
and the closest point on the Metrobus route).  
By focusing on different treatment groups, we are able to identify 
different patterns in the pollutant concentrations and in the dispersion of 
emissions. The distance bands around the BRT line are defined as follows: 0.0-
2.5 km (6 stations), 2.6-5.0 km (4 stations), 5.1-10.0 km (11 stations) and 10.1-
30.0 km (12 stations). These distance bands were defined based on the number 
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of available air monitoring stations measuring each pollutant and their distance 
from the BRT corridor. Figure 2.1 shows a map with the BRT route, as well as 
the air quality monitoring stations in the treatment and control groups. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of the Metrobus line 1 (19.6 km) and location of the air 
quality monitoring stations 
Source: Original Map from Google Maps. Own inclusion of the Metrobus line and air quality 
monitoring stations for all areas considered [0-2.5 km (6); 2.6-5.0 km (4); 5.1-10.0 km (11); 
10.1-30.0 km (12)]. Treated stations are marked red and control stations are marked yellow. 
 
Models 1-3 consider a treatment group of different sizes in the direct 
proximity of the Metrobus corridor: Model 1 uses the area in a 2.5-km radius 
around the Metrobus route, while Models 2 and 3 expand that radius to 5 and 
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10 km, respectively. It should be noted that Model 3 includes all available air 
quality monitoring stations. In contrast, models 4 and 5 do not consider direct 
proximity to the corridor, but focus instead on specific areas around the 
Metrobus route (2.6-5.0 km and 5.1-10.0 km, respectively). We expect to see the 
most marked changes in model 1, while models 2 and 3 should show weaker 
effects. The inclusion of Models 4 and 5 should help us identify more precisely 
the areas driving the results of Models 2 and 3. Intuitively, the effects in model 
1 should be greater than those in models 4 and 5 (that is, if there are any 
noticeable effects). An illustrative scheme can be found in Figure A2.2 in the 
Appendix. 
 
5. Data and variables 
Pollution levels vary depending on a range of meteorological factors that have 
to be taken into consideration to capture this variation. Air contaminants are 
not static and so the average daily wind speed and average daily wind direction 
are included in the model. Wind direction is an important factor as a significant 
amount of pollution might be created in heavily industrial areas and then 
transported to other parts of the metropolitan area. Not only are pollutants 
transported, they also undergo a number of reaction processes. The rates of 
these reactions are influenced by temperature, so the average daily temperature 
needs to be considered. Water can result in a reactive change in the equilibrium 
or it may increase sedimentation; thus, relative humidity and daily rainfall are 
both included. Rainfall also reduces significantly the amount of pollutants in the 
air and so this meteorological variable has to be included. Note, however, that 
owing to data limitations, rainfall is calculated as the sum of daily rainfall 
amounts. 
Data on air-related control variables (relative humidity, temperature, 
wind direction and wind speed) were obtained from Mexico City’s Environment 
Secretary, which serves as the official monitoring entity. Data on air quality and 
amount of polluting emissions come from the Atmosphere Monitoring System 
(SIMAT), which comprises a network of around 40 monitoring points 
distributed across the Mexico City metro-area (see Table A2.1 in the Appendix 
for the exact location of the stations). The SIMAT network is divided into four 
monitoring subsystems, each measuring different atmospheric components and 
factors. The emission measurements takes place automatically every 10 minutes. 
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For the analysis of air pollutants, the RAMA (Automatic Network for 
Atmospheric Monitoring) subsystem serves as the source for all pollutant 
measurements. The RAMA network comprises 29 monitoring stations (their 
location is displayed in Figure A2.1 in the Appendix). The pollutants monitored 
are carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
particles of the order of 10 micrometers or less in aerodynamic diameter (PM10). 
A few stations –only seven- also collect data for particles of the order of 2.5 
micrometers or less (PM2.5). Air quality monitoring stations are commonly 
installed on top of buildings, but not at street level directly. They are usually at 
a tree’s height.3 
Data on the meteorological parameters are obtained from the 
Meteorology and Solar Radiation Network subsystem (REDMET), which 
comprises 19 continuous monitoring stations that measure wind direction, wind 
speed, temperature, humidity, atmospheric pressure and solar radiation. 
Unfortunately, data on atmospheric pressure and solar radiation are not 
available after 2003, which is a limitation of the model presented below.  
Further data on rainfall were provided by Mexico City’s Water Systems 
office (SACM). This network of rainfall measuring stations comprises 78 
monitoring stations distributed across the metropolitan area. Information on 
the exact location of the stations was denied for reasons of “national security”, 
given that details regarding the city’s waterworks infrastructure are restricted 
access only. However, the names of the stations were provided and as these 
typically include a reference to their location, it was possible with Google Maps 
to approximate the location of most of them. Of the stations, 70.5% were easy 
to locate, 16.7% were roughly approximated and 12.8% of the stations were 
impossible to locate based on their name. Rainfall data was obtained only by 
day, which led us to build the model based on daily averages as shown in Table 
2.3.  
Some of these variables are transformed into logarithms, such that 
relative changes can be interpreted more easily. The variables that are not 
transformed are relative humidity (which is already in percentage), temperature 
and wind direction (both of which follow an ordinal scale). 
  
                                                          
3 Should the local government update its infrastructure, it would be useful to install new air 
quality monitoring stations at street level, such that future research can make a more detailed 
analysis. 
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Table 2.3: Description and Source of the model variables 
Variable Description Source 
CO 
Carbon Monoxide daily average concentration 
(ppm) 
RAMA 
NOX 
Nitrogen oxides daily average concentration 
(ppm) 
RAMA 
PM10 
Airborne particulate matter with aerodynamic 
diameter of less than 10 µm daily average 
concentration (µg/m³) 
RAMA 
SO2 Sulfur Dioxide daily average concentration (ppm) RAMA 
CO(-1), NOX(-1), 
PM10(-1), SO2(-1) 
One period lag (1 day) of the polluting variables RAMA 
Metrobus 
Binary variable: 1 if the time period is after June 
18, 2005, and the air quality measuring station lies 
within treatment area; 0 otherwise. 
Metrobus 
Public Info. 
Office 
Relative humidity Daily average relative humidity (%) REDMET 
Temperature Daily average temperature (°C) REDMET 
Wind Direction Daily average wind direction (Azimuth Degrees) REDMET 
Wind speed Daily average wind speed (m/s) REDMET 
Rainfall Sum of the daily rainfall (mm) SACM 
Day Dummies 
Binary variables for each day of the week (e.g. 1 if 
the day is Monday; 0 otherwise). 
  
Month Dummies 
Binary variables for each month of the year (e.g. 1 
if the month is January; 0 otherwise) 
 
Year Dummies Binary variables for each year between 2003-2007  
Note: ppm = parts per million; µg/m³ = micrograms per cubic meter; m/s = meters per 
second; mm = millimeters. 
 
As the air quality monitoring stations and rainfall measuring stations did 
not coincide, a matching was undertaken. Using the location of the air quality 
monitoring stations the closest rainfall station within a range of less than 10 km 
was selected. We assume that the weather conditions present at the air quality 
stations and at their closest respective rainfall stations do not differ. The rainfall 
stations that could not be located are not considered here given the impossibility 
of matching them to the air quality monitoring stations (the result of the station 
matching is available upon request). 
Our analysis of Metrobus focuses solely on line 1 (opened on 19 June 
2005). We measure its impact for the two-year period prior to its opening and 
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the two-year post-operational period, i.e. from 19 June 2003 until 18 June 2007. 
Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of the model variables (before Logarithms) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Min. Max. Obs. Stations 
CO 1.294 0.601 0.39 6.84 23,589 17 
NOX 59.444 30.011 3.75 241.65 24,139 17 
PM10 51.397 25.074 1.67 318.29 17,925 14 
SO2 9.928 9.928 0.86 115 29,935 23 
Metrobus 0.5 0.5 0 1 1,461 - 
Relative humidity 56.461 12.44 24.74 87.23 16,491 18 
Temperature 16.194 2.406 7.45 23.57 15,469 18 
Wind Direction 186.96 23.53 116.4 295.93 16,612 17 
Wind speed 1.74 0.449 0.92 3.84 16,612 17 
Rainfall 1.633 2.877 0 18.88 113,958 78 
 
 
6. Results 
Tables 2.5-2.9 present the results for the fixed effects regressions. The models 
for CO, NOX, PM10, and SO2 are all jointly statistically significant at the 1% 
level. All estimations include year dummies, which capture time fixed effects 
(coefficients for year and holiday month dummies are not included in the 
outputs, and are available upon request). The within-R² values range between 
0.62-0.64 for CO, 0.58-0.60 for NOX, 0.56-0.57 for PM10, and 0.34-0.36 for SO2. 
Table 2.5 presents the output for the fixed effects estimation of carbon 
monoxide. Results shows a downward trend in the relationship between the 
impact of the introduction of Metrobus on pollution and distance from the 
Metrobus route. In areas near the BRT line, the reduction in concentration was 
7.17%, while in areas lying between 2.5 and 5 km and between 5 and 10 km 
from the route, the reduction was not significant. Comparing models 1-3 with 
models 4 and 5, we see that the area driving the significance of model 2 is the 
one lying between 0 and 2.5 km from the route. 
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Table 2.5: Estimation of the logarithm of Carbon Monoxide (CO) daily average 
concentration 
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(CO) 0.0-2.5 km 0.0-5.0 km 0.0-10.0 km    2.5-5.0 km    5.0-10.0 km    
      
Metrobus -0.0717** -0.0546** -0.0294 -0.00490 0.0330 
 (0.0245) (0.0225) (0.0202) (0.0294) (0.0223) 
Log(CO) (t-1) 0.560*** 0.570*** 0.554*** 0.543*** 0.522*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0206) (0.0177) (0.0205) (0.0173) 
Humidity 0.00787*** 0.00695*** 0.00600*** 0.00811*** 0.00790*** 
 (0.00135) (0.00127) (0.00119) (0.00147) (0.00142) 
Temperature 0.0159* 0.0152** 0.00514 0.0230** 0.00660 
 (0.00698) (0.00633) (0.00631) (0.00706) (0.00739) 
Wind Direction -0.00049** -0.000288* -0.000203 -0.000241 -0.000357 
 (0.000180) (0.000151) (0.000138) (0.000180) (0.000203) 
Log(Wind Speed) -0.414*** -0.411*** -0.432*** -0.417*** -0.448*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0310) (0.0324) 
Log(Rainfall) 3.46e-06 0.000729 -0.00104 -0.00255 -0.00468 
 (0.00412) (0.00392) (0.00361) (0.00507) (0.00441) 
Constant -0.369 -0.332 -0.152 -0.317 -0.153 
 (0.264) (0.272) (0.252) (0.216) (0.201)      
Number of Obs.  2,957 3,566 5,249 2,164 3,238 
Within-R² 0.638 0.632 0.629 0.616 0.624 
The regressions include fixed effects for the air quality monitoring stations, the days of the 
week, the months of the year and for the years in the sample of analysis. Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
The results also identify the positive influence of the time lag on current 
levels of carbon monoxide, i.e., yesterday’s CO-pollution levels largely 
determine today’s pollution levels. A further factor playing a key role in the 
levels of CO in the air is the day of the week. Thus, pollutant levels are much 
higher during the week, when workers have to commute, than on the weekends. 
Environmental factors such as wind and humidity also play a marked role in air 
pollutant concentrations over the city, with both variables being significant. 
The estimations of NOX (Table 2.6) present a similar pattern to that 
presented by CO. Although the outcome is significant in all areas considered in 
the treatment group, the reduction in NOX concentrations is greater in areas 
closest to the Metrobus route. The coefficient sign is negative, which is 
consistent with that of the other pollutants, and it presents values between 4.68 
and 6.46%. The temporal lag plays an important role in the case of NOX, as well 
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as in all the areas defined around the Metrobus route. Higher wind speeds have 
a significant effect on the concentration levels, blowing the pollutant into other 
areas when the wind speed is high. Weekdays have a similar effect on pollutant 
concentrations as that described above for CO. For this pollutant, the year 
dummies are significant, capturing unobserved characteristics related to the time 
trend. 
 
Table 2.6: Estimation of the logarithm of Nitrogen Oxides (NOX) daily average 
concentration 
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(NOx) 0.0-2.5 km 0.0-5.0 km 0.0-10.0 km    2.5-5.0 km    5.0-10.0 km    
      
Metrobus -0.0646* -0.0612** -0.0546** -0.0634* -0.0468** 
 (0.0285) (0.0270) (0.0226) (0.0319) (0.0206) 
Log(NOx) (t-1) 0.460*** 0.457*** 0.433*** 0.445*** 0.421*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0201) (0.0191) (0.0234) (0.0221) 
Humidity 0.00571*** 0.00458*** 0.00354*** 0.00532*** 0.00483*** 
 (0.00124) (0.00114) (0.000991) (0.00131) (0.00120) 
Temperature 0.00917 0.00577 -0.00143 0.0164** 0.00583 
 (0.00651) (0.00594) (0.00545) (0.00673) (0.00613) 
Wind Direction -0.00053** -0.00035** -0.000322** -0.00043** -0.00054*** 
 (0.000163) (0.000125) (0.000112) (0.000155) (0.000164) 
Log(Wind Speed) -0.415*** -0.404*** -0.429*** -0.412*** -0.451*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0251) (0.0233) (0.0284) (0.0279) 
Log(Rainfall) -0.00680 -0.00450 -0.00499 -0.00365 -0.00693 
 (0.00404) (0.00375) (0.00332) (0.00471) (0.00409) 
Constant 2.022*** 2.169*** 2.447*** 2.172*** 2.398*** 
 (0.230) (0.224) (0.166) (0.202) (0.167)      
Number of Obs.  2,986 3,585 5,299 2,482 3,597 
Within-R² 0.598 0.590 0.603 0.575 0.603 
The regressions include fixed effects for the air quality monitoring stations, the days of the 
week, the months of the year and for the years in the sample of analysis. Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
As noted, the results for PM10 present a slight upward bias and should 
be treated with caution. However, the reduction in concentrations was 
significant in all areas. In the area lying within a 2.5-km radius of the Metrobus 
route, the PM10 level fell by 7.65% following the opening of the line. The areas 
lying between 2.5 and 5 and between 5 and 10 km from the route experienced 
a reduction of 7.70 and 7.27% in their levels of PM10, respectively (all reductions 
are statistically significant). Table 2.7 shows how the impact on this pollutant 
fell across all distances, unlike the patterns presented by NOX and CO. 
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Humidity levels, wind speed, and temperature have a high statistically 
significant influence on PM10 concentration levels across all treatment groups. 
Higher humidity levels and higher wind speeds both reduce PM10 
concentrations in the air, whereas rising temperatures increase concentration 
levels. The temporal lag of the endogenous variable indicates that past emission 
levels significantly affect today’s concentration levels. Commuting to work or 
school at peak times during the week creates congestion within the city, which 
increases pollution levels in areas closest to these congested roads. 
 
Table 2.7: Estimation of the logarithm of Particulate Matter with less than 10 
µm (PM10) daily average concentration 
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(PM10) 0.0-2.5 km 0.0-5.0 km 0.0-10.0 km    2.5-5.0 km    5.0-10.0 km          
Metrobus -0.0765** -0.0884** -0.0922*** -0.0770* -0.0727** 
 (0.0308) (0.0292) (0.0299) (0.0314) (0.0269) 
Log(PM10) (t-1) 0.442*** 0.444*** 0.434*** 0.446*** 0.434*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0268) (0.0256) (0.0279) (0.0260) 
Humidity -0.0112*** -0.0111*** -0.0114*** -0.0125*** -0.0130*** 
 (0.00173) (0.00167) (0.00160) (0.00188) (0.00175) 
Temperature 0.0358*** 0.0332*** 0.0327*** 0.0371*** 0.0383*** 
 (0.00832) (0.00812) (0.00769) (0.00885) (0.00803) 
Wind Direction -0.000526* -0.000395* -0.000267 -0.000311 -0.000175 
 (0.000231) (0.000197) (0.000165) (0.000193) (0.000170) 
Log(Wind Speed) -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.260*** -0.226*** -0.239*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0328) (0.0285) (0.0328) (0.0273) 
Log(Rainfall) 0.0116* 0.0118** 0.0106** 0.0102 0.00839 
 (0.00494) (0.00445) (0.00407) (0.00525) (0.00463) 
Constant 2.720*** 2.761*** 2.768*** 2.825*** 2.765*** 
 (0.235) (0.232) (0.214) (0.245) (0.203)       
Number of Obs.  2,054 2,658 3,697 1,611 2,046 
Within-R² 0.573 0.564 0.561 0.573 0.574 
The regressions include fixed effects for the air quality monitoring stations, the days of the 
week, the months of the year and for the years in the sample of analysis. Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
When analyzing PM10 concentration levels, special attention should be 
paid to particle matter of 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (PM2.5). However, 
only seven of the air quality monitoring stations in the network collect data 
about this pollutant, which provided us with a considerably smaller number of 
observations. Despite this, we were able to calculate differences-in-differences 
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estimates for the area lying in a 10-km radius of the Metrobus corridor (with 
almost 2,000 observations). Our results point to a significant reduction (17.9% 
at the 1% level) in pollutant concentration. The results of this estimation are 
available upon request. 
Finally, our estimations of the SO2 concentrations (Table 2.8) do not 
show any significant effect of the introduction of the Metrobus in any of the 
three areas defined around Av. de los Insurgentes. As expected, the signs of the 
coefficients are negative. The variation of the error term is too high to capture 
any significant impact from the Metrobus operation. Moreover, this higher 
variation of the error term is significantly larger than that of the estimations for 
CO, NOX and PM10, leading to a wider confidence interval. The SO2 
concentration reduction caused by the BRT introduction falls therefore inside 
this larger confidence interval, and thus the non-significance. Interestingly, the 
model for this pollutant performs worse in terms of explanatory power, as the 
within-R² coefficient of determination is below that of the other pollutants.4 
BRT units running on diesel came to replace Microbuses using Gasoline 
and Liquefied Petroleum Gas. The non-significance of the policy coefficient is 
likely to be this way because vehicles using gasoline produce less SO2 emissions 
than vehicles running on diesel. The main sources of SO2 emissions are a) 
factories using fossil fuels, coal, diesel and natural gas; b) processes such as oil 
refinement, the production of sulfuric acid and the smelting of zinc, copper and 
plumb; c) geothermic activity taking place in close by volcanos (e.g. the 
Popocatepetl volcano 72 km far away from Mexico City); d) vehicles using 
diesel, which in the case of the Mexico City Metro Area are mostly larger trucks. 
All of these sources of SO2 are normally not located in the area cover by the 
treatment stations, but further away from the BRT route.  
 
 
                                                          
4 Our period of analysis overlaps with the PEMEX Magna gasoline with ultra-low Sulphur 
introduction in October 2006. Because of this overlapping, we restricted the period of analysis 
to September 30, 2006. The results, which are available upon request, remain unchanged in 
sign and significance. Ultra-low Sulphur versions of the PEMEX Premium gasoline and 
PEMEX Diesel were introduced after our period of analysis (2008-2009). For more 
information see NOM-086-SEMARNAT-SENER-SCFI-2005 (Diario Oficial de la Federación: 
30/01/2006). 
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Table 2.8: Estimation of the logarithm of Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) daily average 
concentration 
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(SO2) 0.0-2.5 km 0.0-5.0 km 0.0-10.0 km    2.5-5.0 km    5.0-10.0 km          
Metrobus -0.0490 -0.0693 -0.0446 -0.102 -0.0168 
 (0.0584) (0.0550) (0.0570) (0.0669) (0.0520) 
Log(SO2) (t-1) 0.456*** 0.459*** 0.447*** 0.416*** 0.411*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0250) (0.0240) (0.0273) (0.0269) 
Humidity -0.00127 -0.000469 -0.000548 -0.00369 -0.00277 
 (0.00383) (0.00349) (0.00336) (0.00350) (0.00362) 
Temperature 0.0472** 0.0501** 0.0466** 0.0514** 0.0473** 
 (0.0193) (0.0177) (0.0168) (0.0180) (0.0182) 
Wind Direction 0.00151** 0.00161*** 0.00181*** 0.00212*** 0.00227*** 
 (0.000513) (0.000437) (0.000408) (0.000454) (0.000469) 
Log(Wind Speed) -0.384*** -0.413*** -0.414*** -0.432*** -0.420*** 
 (0.0837) (0.0758) (0.0657) (0.0826) (0.0700) 
Log(Rainfall) 0.0158 0.0143 0.00501 0.0143 0.00243 
 (0.0131) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0145) (0.0138) 
Constant 0.309 0.318 0.244 0.593 0.294 
 (0.474) (0.433) (0.413) (0.412) (0.422)      
Number of Obs.  3,211 3,962 6,198 2,618 4,103 
Within-R² 0.338 0.355 0.343 0.342 0.315 
The regressions include fixed effects for the air quality monitoring stations, the days of the 
week, the months of the year and for the years in the sample of analysis. Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
As above, however, the lagged value of the endogenous variable, and the 
wind and weekday variables have a significant influence on the concentration 
level of SO2. Higher wind speeds reduce levels of concentration while the levels 
rise on days when commuters take to the roads. 
The estimation outputs of the different pollutant molecules show that 
the introduction of the Metrobus had a marked impact on the concentration 
levels of most of the different pollutants in the areas defined. To appreciate 
better the impact of the Metrobus operation on air quality in the Mexico City 
metropolitan area, Table 2.9 summarizes this impact for all pollutants. 
In the case of CO and NOX, pollutant concentrations fall with distance 
from the Metrobus corridor; however, in the case of PM10, the pattern is not 
clear. The fact that particulate matter can have both an anthropogenic and non-
anthropogenic origin (WHO, 2013) may explain why a decreasing reduction 
with distance from the Metrobus route was not found for PM10.  
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Table 2.9: Summary of the impact of the Metrobus implementation on the 
different pollutants 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.0-2.5 km 0.0-5.0 km 0.0-10.0 km    2.5-5.0 km    5.0-10.0 km    
CO -0.0717** -0.0546** -0.0294 -0.00490 0.0330 
  (0.0245) (0.0225) (0.0202) (0.0294) (0.0223) 
NOx -0.0646* -0.0612** -0.0546** -0.0634* -0.0468** 
  (0.0285) (0.0270) (0.0226) (0.0319) (0.0206) 
PM10 -0.0765** -0.0884** -0.0922*** -0.0770* -0.0727** 
  (0.0308) (0.0292) (0.0299) (0.0314) (0.0269) 
SO2 -0.0490 -0.0693 -0.0446 -0.102 -0.0168 
  (0.0584) (0.0550) (0.0570) (0.0669) (0.0520) 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
It should be stressed that the results reported herein are valid only for 
the short term. In the long term, the frequent improvement of existing public 
transport modes will be necessary in combination with “space–transport 
development strategies with the aim of increasing accessibility and reducing air 
pollution” (Ambarwati et al., 2016). To achieve abiding reductions, behavioral 
changes are needed and these are unlikely to occur unless middle/high income 
earners stop perceiving the metro and other modes of public transport as 
inferior goods (Crôtte et al., 2009). 
 
6.1 Robustness Checks 
In order to make sure that the empirical strategy is consistent, alternative 
approaches were employed to analyze the data.5 First, the regressions were run 
again but dropping the year 2005 in order to account for the adoption time of 
the new transport mode. The signs and the significances remained unchanged, 
and the magnitudes did not present major differences. The reductions for the 
area lying within a 2.5-km radius of the BRT corridor were 11.5% for CO, 13.7% 
for NOx, and 8.7% for PM10. 
Furthermore, we open the spectrum of analysis and use an alternative 
empirical method. Instead of employing a differences-in-differences approach, 
we resorted to a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in order to identify 
the effects of the BRT introduction. For this approach, the Metrobus 
operation’s start (19 of June 2005) is seen as the cutoff point around which the 
                                                          
5 The results of all approaches used for the robustness checks are available upon request. 
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mean of observations before and after are expected to be significantly different. 
For this robustness check, different time bands on each side of the cutoff point 
– the Metrobus introduction – were considered: 2 years, 1 year and 6 months. 
This robustness analysis focuses solely on the area between 0 and 2.5 km around 
the Metrobus.  The technical details of this procedure can be found in Hahn et 
al. (2001) or in Khandker et al. (2009). The results of the covariate-adjusted 
sharp regression discontinuity estimates can be found in Table A2.2 in the 
Appendix. We obtain similar results in terms of sign and significance, which 
supports the results obtained in the differences-in-differences estimation. 
However, we consider the differences-in-differences method to be more robust 
and therefore better suited for the Metrobus impact evaluation on air pollution. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper evaluates the short-term impact of the introduction of Bus Rapid 
Transit on pollution levels in Mexico City. The analysis is based on real field 
data obtained from automatic air quality monitoring stations and has focused 
specifically on four pollutants: CO, NOX, PM10 and SO2. 
Results from the differences-in-differences analysis show a significant 
reduction in the concentrations of all the pollutants, except SO2. Specifically, 
CO concentrations were reduced by between 5.5 and 7.2%, NOX by between 
4.7 and 6.5%, and PM10 by between 7.3 and 9.2%, depending on the city area. 
In the case of SO2, our results are negative though not statistically significant. 
The estimation using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors failed to reveal any 
significant impact of the introduction of BRT.  
It would be inappropriate to generalize the impact of BRT on air quality 
reported here to a longer time framework and to all cities, given that we have 
focused on evaluating short-term effects for the Mexico-City Metropolitan 
Area. Clearly, geographical and atmospheric traits will differ from one location 
to another. Moreover, further studies are needed in order to determine whether 
commuters show an enduring behavioral change (switching from private cars to 
BRT) and whether road congestion in the treated area was actually reduced. To 
date, the statistics indicate that the number of people using BRT continues to 
increase as the network expands. Future research would also benefit from 
comparing the reduction in emissions reported here with those detected in other 
metropolitan areas based on real field data, and from determining whether the 
latter are consistent with the findings herein.  
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For cities with similar characteristics to those of Mexico City, our results 
might encourage the expansion of their BRT networks, the regular introduction 
of cleaner BRT-units, and an increase in the size of their BRT fleets to provide 
a better standard of service, measures that should motivate more people to 
switch from private cars to public transport. It is important to recall, however, 
that the emission impact of each BRT line will be different for every corridor, 
and that other factors are likely to play a role.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure A2.1: Evolution of the different pollutant concentrations in the period 
June 2003 – June 2007 
 
Source: Based on data from Mexico City’s Environment Secretary (Secretaría del 
Medio Ambiente, SEDEMA).  
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Treated Stations
Control Stations 
Stations not taken into consideration
Figure A2.2: Simplified scheme of the different models used in the analysis 
(1) 
 
 
BRT 
0.0-2.5 km 
2.6-5.0 km 
5.1-10.0 km 
10.0-30.0 km 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
 (4) 
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Source: own elaboration. 
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Table A2.1: Coordinates of the automatic air quality measuring stations and 
distance to the Metrobus corridor 
Code 
Air Quality Measurement 
Station 
Latitude Longitude 
Distance to 
BRT Corridor 
(in KM) 
ACO Acolman 19.635501 -98.912003 26.30 
ARA Aragón 19.471380 -99.074546 5.30 
ATI Atizapán 19.576963 -99.254133 16.70 
AZC Azcapotzalco 19.488893 -99.198653 6.22 
CAM Camarones 19.468404 -99.169794 2.41 
CES Cerro de la Estrella 19.335884 -99.074675 11.70 
CHO Chalco 19.266948 -98.886088 29.87 
COY Coyoacán 19.350258 -99.157101 2.95 
CUA Cuajimalpa 19.365313 -99.291705 10.90 
FAC FES Acatlán 19.482473 -99.243524 10.10 
IMP Instituto Mex. del Petróleo 19.488720 -99.147294 2.06 
IZT Iztacalco 19.384413 -99.117641 5.82 
LAG Lagunilla 19.443581 -99.135184 1.91 
LLA Los Laureles 19.578792 -99.039644 11.90 
LPR La Presa 19.534727 -99.117720 3.71 
LVI La Villa 19.469051 -99.117754 1.71 
MER Merced 19.424610 -99.119594 4.15 
MON Montecillo 19.460415 -98.902853 23.00 
PED Pedregal 19.325146 -99.204136 1.98 
PLA Plateros 19.367028 -99.200105 1.90 
SAG San Agustín 19.532968 -99.030324 9.83 
SJA San Juan de Aragón 19.452592 -99.086095 5.44 
SUR Santa Úrsula 19.314480 -99.149994 5.04 
TAC Tacuba 19.455068 -99.202453 5.19 
TAH Tláhuac 19.246459 -99.010564 21.60 
TAX Taxqueña 19.336841 -99.123203 6.77 
TLA Tlalnepantla 19.529077 -99.204597 9.59 
TLI Tultitlán 19.602542 -99.177173 12.80 
TPN Tlalpan 19.257041 -99.184177 9.10 
UIZ UAM Iztapalapa 19.360794 -99.073880 11.00 
VAL Vallejo 19.523598 -99.165702 5.55 
VIF Villa de las Flores 19.657671 -99.096307 17.60 
XAL Xalostoc 19.525995 -99.082400 4.62 
Source: Mexico City’s Environment Secretary (Secretaría del Medio Ambiente, SEDEMA). 
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Table A2.2: Results of the Regression Discontinuity Design 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  CO NOx PM10 
2 years    
Coefficient -0.295*** -0.247*** -0.149*** 
Standard Errors (0.0293) (0.0901) (0.0299) 
Observations 1,402 1,103 1,047 
    
1 years    
Coefficient -0.236*** -0.256*** -0.0144 
Standard Errors (0.0436) (0.0854) (0.0421) 
Observations 692 551 556 
    
6months    
Coefficient -0.216*** -0.0623 0.0656* 
Standard Errors (0.0346) (0.0465) (0.0350) 
Observations 256 216 224 
Standard errors adjusted by station clustering in parentheses.          
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Assessing the Effects of the Mexican Drug War on 
Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis  
 
 
 
Abstract 
Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006. From the 
outset, his government deployed an aggressive security policy to fight drug 
trafficking organizations, in what became known as the ‘Mexican Drug War’. 
The policy was to earn considerable criticism owing to the heavy number of 
unintended casualties resulting from the frontal assault waged against the drug 
cartels. In this article, we evaluate the economic effects of the Mexican Drug 
War policy. To do so, we study the effects of the rise in the homicide rate and 
changes in a state-level approximation of the military budget on economic 
growth. Using dynamic panel data econometrics, we find that while the growth 
in the number of homicides had negative and significant effects on state GDP 
growth, state military expenditure aimed at fighting drug trafficking had a 
positive and significant effect on the per capita economic growth rate. 
 
Keywords:  Drug Trafficking Organizations; Militarized disputes; 
Security policy; Homicides; Mexico; Drug War  
JEL Codes:   H56, K42, R11 
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1. Introduction 
At the end of 2006, Felipe Calderón’s government declared a war on drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs),6 and ordered the military to take strong action 
against the drug cartels. The military initiated a series of operations targeting the 
most dangerous drug criminals in Mexico. However, the criminals fought back, 
resulting in thousands of casualties (including, criminals, police, the military, and 
civil population). Indeed, the detention and eventual killing of the drug lords 
left a power vacuum that rival organizations sought to fill, which further 
increased the number of victims.  
From the 1990s through to the mid-2000s, Mexico’s homicide rate had 
fallen to an all-time low by 2007 of 8.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (an 
absolute total of 8,861). Shirk and Wallman (2015) claim that if the fall had 
continued, the homicide rate would have eventually reached similar levels to 
those in the US (five homicides per 100,000 inhabitants). However, the 
homicide rate increased dramatically, reaching a high of 23.0 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2011. The Mexican National Statistics Institute (INEGI) 
recorded 121,613 homicides in the country during Calderón’s administration, 
while during Vicente Fox’s preceding administration (2001-2006) the number 
of homicides was less than half (60,162). When Calderón left office, the 
homicide rate fell slightly for a time, but recently it has risen again. Indeed, since 
the end of Calderón’s administration in 2012, the strategy to fight DTOs has 
not changed significantly. 
Although there are barely any studies analyzing the impact of this 
spiraling violence on GDP, evidence suggests that foreign direct investment 
(FDI) experienced a setback in some industries (e.g. Mining and Oil Extraction) 
(Ashby and Ramos, 2013). However, this study analyzed all Mexican states 
together, regardless of whether they presented signs of DTO violence, and so 
the setback may be attributable to other factors. Yet, firms and individuals 
settled in dangerous regions have opted to move away to safer areas. According 
to NRC/IDMC (2010), 230,000 people are estimated to have fled their homes 
(up to 2010). Moreover, various countries have issued recommendations to their 
citizens not to visit certain areas of Mexico (Zapata, 2011). But whether these 
factors have affected the GDP growth rate has yet to be analyzed. 
                                                          
6 The U.S. National Drug Threat Assessment defines DTOs as “complex organizations with 
highly defined command-and-control structures that produce, transport, and/or distribute 
large quantities of one or more illicit drugs.” (DOJ, 2010, p.10). 
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Economic variables seem likely to be linked closely to the violence 
problem. Terrorist acts, such as those perpetrated in Spain, Turkey and Israel, 
have shown that economies suffer major setbacks from violence. While the 
terrorism-related literature can serve as a point of reference here, we cannot 
apply its findings to the case of DTO violence in Mexico, as terrorism and drug 
trafficking are very different in nature. 
Based on the number of victims during Mexico’s recent drug crusade and 
the opportunity costs of government spending on its fight against DTOs, it is 
reasonable to expect that Mexico’s economy was affected by DTO activities. A 
society that experiences violent acts faces not only the costs suffered by those 
directly and indirectly affected, but also the political and institutional costs. 
Acemoglu et al. (2013) point out that when the relationship between the actors 
controlling institutions and criminals reaches certain levels, a symbiotic 
relationship may emerge and non-state actors are able to influence policy 
decisions. Events in Italy illustrate how criminal organizations like the Mafias 
have poisoned and corrupted government at the highest levels (Alesina et al., 
2016), while Colombia faced the same problem up until the end of the 20th 
century, when the drug cartels of Medellin and Cali were particularly strong.  
A number of studies have analyzed the economic effects of drug-related 
violence, but what we do in this article is to assess the specific impact of 
President Calderón’s policy aimed at fighting DTOs and drug-related violence. 
To do so, we analyze the effects of increases in drug-related violence (based on 
homicide rates) and a state-level approximation of the military budget on the 
growth of state GDP per capita. For this purpose, we work in a well-known 
growth setting, using the β-convergence framework, while also considering the 
possibility of spatial effects between states. The objective of this paper is to 
assess not only how violence deterred economic activity, but more importantly 
how government action in the form of military expenditure affected state 
economic growth. 
To analyze the impact of military expenditure, we approximate state-level 
military budgets, and weight them by crime variables associated with the drug 
cartels and the fight against DTOs. 
Thus, we make several contributions to the literature: 1) we undertake an 
economic analysis of the ‘Drug War’ policy and how it impacted economic 
growth in the Mexican states. Although the effects of the violence escalated, we 
focus on the actions implemented by the central government, specifically in the 
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form of military expenditure, to tackle the problem of DTOs in the territory. 
To the best of our knowledge, the impact of state-level military spending on the 
per capita GDP growth rate, against the backdrop of the Mexican Drug War, 
has never been analyzed before. 2) By using the β-convergence framework, as 
developed within economic theory, and by employing dynamic panel data, for 
the empirical analysis, we build upon existing efforts to assess the effects of 
violence generated by the presence of DTOs and government attempts to fight 
drug criminals. In so doing, we link the empirical analysis of national security 
policy with economic theory in a more effective way than previous studies 
examining violence and economic growth in Mexican states that fail to consider 
the dynamic nature of the data. 3) Our approach captures the violence generated 
by the presence of DTOs by employing a range of different variables. We also 
make several approximations of military spending at the state level, given that 
such information is not publicly available in Mexico. To overcome this 
limitation, we develop a new method to estimate military expenditure at the state 
level in a developing country. By using a range of options for both variables, we 
are able to endow our analysis with greater robustness.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Economic Growth in Mexico 
The analysis we undertake of the effects of homicides and military expenditure 
on economic growth is based on a growth model, and several studies in the 
literature are of particular relevance to the case we present. The speed of 
convergence of an economy does not always remain the same. There will be 
periods in which convergence accelerates and others in which it slows down. 
Similarly, regional economies within a country may grow at different speeds, 
leading to convergence or divergence.  
Chiquiar (2005), in a study of income convergence across Mexican states, 
suggests that the divergence pattern that emerged in the mid-1980s was not 
reversed with the signing of NAFTA, and that Mexican regions became more 
sensitive to new sources of growth. Likewise, for this same period, Rodríguez-
Oreggia (2005) contends that differences in growth across states can be 
attributed to disparities in human capital, with northern and central states 
boasting higher skilled workers than those found in Mexico’s southern states. 
Carrion-i-Silvestre and German-Soto (2007) took a time series from 1940-2001 
and found evidence of convergence after controlling for structural breaks. In a 
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more recent study, Cabral and Mollick (2012), using dynamic panel data 
techniques, found positive rates of output convergence across Mexican regions: 
9.4% for the period 1996 to 2006. 
All these studies analyzed periods of time prior to the Mexican Drug 
War, which was initiated in 2007. It is our conjecture that the speed of 
convergence might have changed for those Mexican states that were most 
affected by the policy outcomes (i.e. drastic increase in the homicide rate).  
 
2.2 Drug Trafficking Organizations 
A difficulty when fighting DTOs is that the actions undertaken by governments 
often just shift the problem to another location. The spatial competition model 
developed by Rasmussen et al. (1993) suggests that higher drug enforcement in 
one jurisdiction simply moves the drug problem to neighboring jurisdictions, 
resulting in higher violent crime rates. Their analysis concludes that “Drug 
enforcement increases violent crime due to the disruption of spatial equilibria 
in drug markets” (Rasmussen et al., 1993, pp. 229-230).  
In countries facing insurgency movements, governments seek to fight 
the insurgents by military means and by providing services to incentivize the 
community to share information. Berman et al. (2011) examined the case of Iraq 
and found that regional spending on public goods is violence-reducing. 
However, Andreas (2004, p. 650) argues that “[m]ilitary success on the 
battlefield can significantly depend on entrepreneurial success in the illicit 
economy […]”. 
The economic literature on DTOs is scarce. Several scholars have opted 
to place the violent acts happening in Mexico in the same category as terrorist 
or counter-insurgency acts. As Williams (2012) explains, this characterization is 
wrong, since the killings in Mexico are not motivated by politics, ideology or 
religion and he stresses that while there is some evidence of ‘careless’ violence 
(some civilians have been erroneously executed or caught in the crossfire), the 
violence in Mexico has been quite selective. 
The reasons for violence in Mexico are diverse. Variables such as the 
poverty rate, unemployment and weak institutions all play an important role. 
For example, Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) find that criminal organizations are 
more successful at recruiting people with lower incomes. In Mexico, where 
DTOs have been active for decades, the reasons for the rise in the homicide 
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rate appear to be more closely associated with the increase in reprisal killings, 
the wars waged between rival DTOs and clashes with the armed forces. Rios 
(2013) claims that the violence is driven by two mechanisms: 1) the competition 
between DTOs to expand their drug trafficking turf, and 2) government action 
in the form of police and military operations to apprehend drug cartel members. 
These two mechanisms are obviously interconnected, since when the leaders of 
a dominant DTO are arrested, its competitors see an opportunity to expand into 
their territory, with a resulting escalation in violence. 
A recent study investigating violence and the effects of DTOs in Mexico 
(Dell, 2015) shows that drug-related violence increases substantially after closely 
fought mayoral elections involving a change in the ruling party.7 This result is in 
line with the findings of Snyder and Duran-Martinez (2009), Astorga and Shirk 
(2010) and Chabat (2010). A wave of violence following a change in the ruling 
party at the municipal level seems to indicate that the previous incumbent had 
entered into agreements with DTOs. Following the elections, these agreements 
are no longer binding and, as the police and military forces seek to capture the 
drug lords, violence breaks out. The Italian mafia display a similar pattern of 
behavior: “regions with a greater presence of criminal organizations are 
characterized by abnormal increases in homicides during the year before 
elections” (Alesina et al., 2016, p.2). 
  
2.3 Economic Effects of Drug Violence  
Several studies have looked at economic variables and how the presence of 
organized crime affects them. For instance, Cabral et al. (2016) report that a rise 
in crime has negative effects on labor productivity. Ashby and Ramos (2013) 
find that organized crime in Mexico deters FDI in financial services, commerce 
and agriculture. In terms of human capital accumulation, Marquez-Padilla et al. 
(2015) report barely any effect on total enrollment in schools. In their analysis 
of income inequality, Enamorado et al. (2016) estimate that a one-point increase 
in the Gini coefficient increases the number of drug-related homicides by 36%. 
Finally, Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano (2017) study migration flows 
                                                          
7 Our analysis also included a test of political changes at the state level. Several dummy 
variables were used to test whether states governed by PRI or by PAN showed abnormal 
increases in their crime variables after state elections. None of the results was significant. 
Results are available upon request. 
Essays on Public Policies in Mexico: Pollution, Employment and Drug Crime 
________________________________________________________________________ 
55 
 
and find that migration decisions are sensitive to both local violence and transit 
(on route) violence. 
However, other studies conclude that the presence of DTOs could have 
various “positive” effects for the local economy. In their bid to expand their 
influence, DTOs need to infiltrate the social structure and attract members of 
the local community into the ranks that make up what is a labor-intensive drug 
production chain (Rios, 2008). Having a DTO in town can lead to higher rates 
of employment and higher wages for those involved in production, transport 
and distribution. Fernández-Menéndez and Ronquillo (2006) report that 
farmers involved in marijuana and poppy production can earn wages that are 
several times higher than normal, in addition to receiving a generous lump-sum 
payment. Likewise, anecdotal evidence suggests that DTOs can have a positive 
economic impact: “The narcoeconomy ushered certain forms of consumption 
into an otherwise stagnant, marginal community; it brought money back into 
the community in various forms of legal reinvestment activities, such as farms 
and businesses; and it provided many people with all manner of jobs.” 
(McDonald, 2005, p. 121). 
A further consequence of a town’s being under the influence of a DTO 
might be that corrupt government agents work for the benefit of the DTO, 
accepting bribes and sabotaging police operations. Meanwhile, these corrupt 
agents have to launder their bribe money without raising suspicions. Moreover, 
by focusing federal police or military operations within a specific state means 
that federal police forces and soldiers have to be relocated to that state, with the 
resulting additional expenditure for the government. 
To the best of our knowledge, the effects of the Mexican Drugs War on 
the country’s GDP and income growth have been examined primarily in three 
studies. First, Robles et al. (2013) use electricity bills as a GDP proxy to estimate 
the impact of violence on GDP and unemployment using IV and Synthetic 
Control methods. They find that an increase of 10 homicides per 100,000 
habitants results in an increase of around 1.5% in the rate of unemployment, a 
0.4% reduction in the proportion of business owners, and a 1.2% reduction in 
average income. In addition, they use a synthetic control to estimate that 
electricity consumed per capita fell in the first 2 years after a conflict involving 
two DTOs.  
 Second, Pan et al. (2012) use a spatial model to estimate the impact of 
violence on GDP between 2005 and 2009. They find that while GDP growth is 
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positively related to crime within a specific state in the previous year, it is 
negatively related to crime in its surrounding states. An interesting aspect of this 
study is the introduction of an aggregate variable of federal grants (education, 
public security, health services, and social infrastructure). The model 
specification features an aggregate crime variable, which includes fraud, rape, 
assault, property damage, homicide, and other crimes. 
Third, Enamorado et al. (2014) employ the β-convergence framework to 
estimate the impact of drug-related homicides on real income growth in Mexico. 
They find evidence of a negative impact of drug-related homicides on income 
growth in Mexican municipalities between 2005 and 2010. Their model 
considers aggregate figures of public expenditure at the local level, which are 
found to be significant. When comparing the effects of drug-related homicides 
with those of non-drug-related homicides, they obtain negative and significant 
results for the drug-related homicide rate. The model recognizes some form of 
spatial interaction since it clusters the standard errors by state.  
These last two studies are particularly relevant to the case we deal with 
here as both approaches seek to link their empirical models to the growth 
literature in a similar way to the method we adopt here. However, our analysis 
differs from these two studies in various ways. We seek to undertake a more 
comprehensive analysis of the Drug War in Mexico by including an 
approximation of military expenditure instead of using federal grants (Pan et al., 
2012) and municipal government expenditure (Enamorado et al., 2014). The 
expenditure figures used by these two studies are not earmarked to fight DTOs, 
while a key feature of our study is that we explicitly model the Mexican 
government’s policy to fight DTOs by including military expenditure.  
Other differences concern choices regarding the empirical methodology 
and data employed. Enamorado et al. (2014) opt for ordinary least squares and 
two-stage least squares in conducting their cross-sectional analysis, whereas Pan 
et al. (2012) use a spatial model with panel data. Neither of these models is 
dynamic. Here, by employing a difference-generalized method of moments 
(GMM) model, we take into account the dynamic nature of the data, and control 
for autocorrelation. The range of our data is also greater than that drawn on in 
these two previous studies. By considering data from 2003 to 2013 we cover all 
of Calderón’s presidency (and several years before).  
In the absence of the policy implemented by Calderón’s administration, 
it is likely that the homicide rate, in common with other crime indicators, would 
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have followed the downward trend and eventually abated. However, the 
violence of this period was generated by a) the confrontation between 
government officials and DTO members; b) the struggles that broke out 
between DTO lieutenants as they fought to take power following the beheading 
of a DTO; and c) the expansion of turf boundaries by a DTO and the ensuing 
struggle for power with a competing DTO.  
To enhance the measurement of crime indicators related to DTOs, we 
gave individual consideration to a range of high-impact crime variables. Indeed, 
these were the variables used by the government to assess progress during the 
Drug War. Government expenditure on the fight against crime is central to our 
model, since we wish to identify the effect of this spending on the state 
economy. Therefore, we concentrate on an approximation of state-level military 
budgets.  
 
3. The Policy 
During the last decade of the 20th century, the number of DTOs increased as a 
result of cartel fragmentation, an increase in political competition, and anti-
corruption reforms (Snyder and Duran-Martinez, 2009, p. 270). The growth of 
DTOs across the country weakened the government’s position, even had they 
wanted to strike a new deal with the drug lords.  
Towards the end of Fox’s administration (2001-2006), DTO-related 
homicides rose significantly, from 9,329 in 2004 to 10,452 in 2006. 
Unsurprisingly, one of the main pillars of Calderón’s campaign was to 
strengthen the rule of law, given that to continue tolerating DTOs would have 
represented too high a political cost (Chabat, 2010). In December 2006, 
Calderón launched the 2007-2012 Directive for the Integral Fight against Drug 
Trafficking (Directiva para el Combate Integral al Narcotráfico 2007-2012).  
While the Mexican military had played some role in fighting the DTOs 
for some time, the Directive introduced new and more aggressive guidelines 
against drug trafficking. It identified four strategies to support its national 
security policy: 1) Improve operation schemes to eradicate local cultivations, 
intercept illegal drug trafficking, and fight DTOs; 2) Contribute to activities 
organized by public security institutions to guarantee a safe social environment; 
3) Help maintain the rule of law by fighting armed criminal organizations; 4) 
Strengthen army and air force capacities to enforce laws against firearms and 
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explosives. This fourth point aimed at identifying and stopping the illegal 
firearm flows coming from the U.S. 
With the new Directive, “[t]he federal government […] deployed 
thousands of federal troops to man checkpoints, establish street patrols, and 
oversee other domestic law enforcement functions in high drug violence states” 
(Shirk, 2012, p. 10). In addition, the military inspected hangars, deposits, mail 
delivery companies, and bus and train stations. The military also cooperated 
with police forces to stop criminals. During Calderón’s administration, the 
Defense Department reported the detention of 9 high-ranking drug lords and 
149 cartel lieutenants (Defense Department’s activities reports, 2007-2012). 
 
Figure 3.1: Evolution of the real military spending and the homicide rate per 
100,000 habitants, 2000-2013 
 
Source: Based on data from INEGI and PEF. 
 
The fight against the drug cartels was not conducted by the military 
forces alone. In fact, Calderón deployed the army, navy, and federal police 
forces, which reflected the lack of capacity or integrity (or both) of local police 
(Shirk and Wallman, 2015). The role played by the navy is particularly 
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interesting; according to Camp (2010), the navy tends to be more transparent 
than the army, and more willing to cooperate internationally. If we compare the 
respective forces, we find that in 2012 the navy numbered 53,505 sailors, while 
the army totaled 209,716 soldiers. Figure A3.1 in the Appendix compares the 
evolution in the two forces’ budgets during the Drug War. 
Military operations are costly, and indeed the government increased the 
Defense Department’s budget over real GDP from 0.24% in 2006 to 0.47% by 
2012. If we consider total military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, then it 
rose from 0.4 to 0.6% between 2006 and 2012, according to World Bank data. 
Similarly, expenditure increased in all Mexico’s military regions, but regions III, 
IV, V and VI (where the Drug War waged was particularly intense) recorded 
larger increases in several years, and an increase well above the average for the 
period. Figure A3.2 in the Appendix shows the budget increases for all military 
regions in the period 2006-2012. 
Calderón’s determination to fight the drug cartels won the support of the 
U.S. government. On 30 June 2008, the Merida Initiative was passed by the U.S. 
congress. As a result of this initiative, the U.S. government offered to support 
the Mexican government with a three-year, $1.4 billion U.S. Dollar aid package 
to be used for judicial reform, institution-building, human rights and rule-of-law 
issues (Shirk, 2010). In addition, the Mexican military acquired helicopters and 
surveillance aircrafts. Despite Calderón’s policy (or, perhaps, because of it), the 
number of homicides in the country rose markedly during the administration. 
In fact, all criminal activities related to DTOs experienced a significant increase: 
drug trafficking, homicides, kidnappings, the armed robbery of vehicles, etc. 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution in military spending and the homicide 
rate per 100,000 habitants, while Figure 3.2 shows that crime increased 
substantially during the period 2006-2012. The largest increases were recorded 
in extortion (113%), kidnapping (79%), homicides (70%), and aggravated 
robbery (41%). 
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Figure 3.2: Rate of crime variables associated to DTOs per 100,000 habitants 
in Mexico, 1999-2013 
 
Source: Based on data from INEGI and SNSP. 
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4. Empirical Strategy 
We use a simple Cobb-Douglas production function, in line with that proposed 
in Mankiw et al. (1992), and adapt it to the regional β-convergence hypothesis, 
as discussed in Barro et al. (1991). β-convergence refers to the negative 
relationship between the rate of growth of a particular variable (here GDP per 
capita) and the initial level of that variable. Furthermore, we model violence and 
the efforts to fight this violence by introducing a deterrent variable. The 
development of the theoretical model is presented in Appendix A and B. For 
our empirical strategy, we introduce the following econometric specification of 
the dynamic panel data model used herein: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + (1 + 𝛽1)𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 
+𝛿2𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of real state GDP in per capita terms, 𝛼 is the 
intercept, 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is the logarithm of initial state GDP per capita and 𝛽1 = −(1 −
𝑒−𝛽0𝑇), which informs us about the speed of convergence. This becomes 
evident if we transform equation (1) into first differences, as proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), to eliminate state-specific effects: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1  = 𝛼 − (1 − 𝑒
−𝛽0𝑇)𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑛𝑖𝑡 
+𝛿1∆𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿2∆𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3∆𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
In this specification, real state GDP is expressed in per capita terms. In 
addition to fitting the theoretical model, the per capita adjustment of real GDP 
helps to control for population size and migration. This variable selection is in 
line with that employed in similar studies, including Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003), Bilgel and Karahasan (2015) and Pinotti (2014). 
Furthermore, 𝑘𝑖𝑡 and ℎ𝑖𝑡 are the variables that approximate physical and 
human capital (in logarithms), respectively, and 𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the population growth 
rate. We also introduce a dummy for the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the 
logarithm of the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants (𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡), and the 
logarithm of the approximation of state military spending in per capita terms 
(𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡). Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a stochastic error term. 
To ensure that our model is correctly specified, we ran several diagnostic 
tests to check that no important assumptions of our spatial model are violated. 
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With variance inflection factors between 1.02 and 1.19 for all variables, we can 
rule out the presence of multicollinearity. To control for heteroscedasticity, we 
used robust standard errors. Furthermore, we included a one-period time lag of 
the dependent variable to account for the time autocorrelation. 
Overall, we expect positive signs for the lagged absolute value of real 
GDP per capita, physical capital and human capital, whereas the 2008-2009 
financial crisis should have a negative impact on the economy of the states. We 
also expect the homicide rate to negatively affect the economy. In the case of 
the government expenditure variable in the form of military spending, we expect 
a positive sign, given that the Drug War does not destroy physical assets and 
that government spending enters the GDP equation positively from the demand 
side. 
  
5. Data 
For our estimations, we draw on balanced panel data for all 32 Mexican states 
(the Distrito Federal, the capital, is considered a contiguous state) for the period 
2001-2013. The state-level is the smallest spatial unit for which all the variables 
considered here were available. During this period, a political change took place 
at the presidential level. With this, an important shift was recorded in homeland 
security policy. This period also coincides with the 2007-2012 Directive for the 
Integral Fight against Drug Trafficking, or ‘Drug War’.  
We obtained population data for each state from the National Population 
Council (CONAPO), the institution responsible for overseeing the national 
census. The last census was conducted in 2010. We also use CONAPO’s 
population forecasts for 2010-2013. These population data are used to compute 
per capita figures and violence rates. The time series for real state GDP by state 
were obtained from INEGI. Figure A3.3 in the Appendix shows cross-sectional 
maps of GDP per capita growth from 2004-2013.  
In the absence of official capital stock data, we use the figures presented 
in German-Soto (2015), which are a computation of the capital stock data 
described in German-Soto (2008). Data for human capital are also scarce. The 
regional science literature circumvents this problem by using the regional share 
of population with tertiary education. However, this information is not available 
for the whole period. Therefore, we opted to use state averages of years of 
schooling instead.  
Essays on Public Policies in Mexico: Pollution, Employment and Drug Crime 
________________________________________________________________________ 
63 
 
Both INEGI and the Interior Department publish homicide statistics. 
INEGI uses administrative registers from the National Health Information 
System (SINAIS), which follow the classification recommended by the WHO, 
whereas the Interior Department compiles its data from police investigation 
files. Although INEGI is unable to identify a homicide as being related to a drug 
crime, we opted for this source for several reasons. First, INEGI is a more 
trustworthy source than the Interior Ministry due to its autonomy (working as 
it does independently of any law-enforcement agency). Second, there have been 
newspaper reports about police forces failing to investigate murders in some 
northern states due to the great volume of homicides. According to Shirk and 
Wallman (2015), less than 25 percent of crimes are reported, and only 20 percent 
of these are investigated. And, third, it has been suggested that the government 
might manipulate data to improve its approval ratings and to support its security 
strategy.  
Information about military and navy budgets is not publicly available at 
the state level. We undertook searches of government records and budgets but 
were unable to find state budgets for either military or navy spending. We 
followed this up with a formal information request, but were informed that this 
information was only available at the regional level. We managed to obtain 
regional military budgets for the 12 regions that are made available in the 
Federation’s Expenditure Budget (Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación, PEF) for 
each year. This subdivision into regions was only available for the military, but 
not for the navy or federal police. For that reason, we focus on the military 
budget only. 
The budget contains information on a wide range of subjects including 
the funding destined to each of the 12 military regions. Each region can 
comprise up to five states. Figure 3.3 describes which states make up each 
military region.  
Due to the lack of data on military budgets by state, we approximate 
them by weighting the regional budget with variables that are good indicators 
of military involvement in the ‘Drug War’. First, we took the number of 
homicides in each state. Moreover, when conducting the robustness checks, we 
also considered the number of people detained during operations targeting 
DTO activities, the number of vehicles seized either in operations targeting drug 
criminals or when conducting searches at specific check-points, and the number 
of investigation files opened. Using these variables only (and not any other crime 
variables) to weight military budgets adheres to the intuition that military 
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budgets are assigned to those areas (states) where the activity of the DTOs is 
most intense. Most military regions comprise either two or three states, which 
means the error associated with the weighting of the variables is limited. 
Dividing a national budget by the 32 states would, on the other hand, contain a 
large error.  
Figure 3.3: Mexican Military Regions 
 
 
Note: The Mexican Military Regions comprise the following federal states: 
Military Region I: Distrito Federal; Hidalgo; State of Mexico; Morelos 
Military Region II: Baja California; Baja California Sur; Sonora 
Military Region III: Sinaloa; Durango 
Military Region IV: Nuevo León; San Luis Potosí; Tamaulipas 
Military Region V: Aguascalientes; Colima; Jalisco; Nayarit; Zacatecas 
Military Region VI: Puebla; Tlaxcala; Veracruz 
Military Region VII: Chiapas; Tabasco 
Military Region VIII: Oaxaca 
Military Region IX: Guerrero 
Military Region X: Campeche; Quintana Roo; Yucatán 
Military Region XI: Chihuahua; Coahuila 
Military Region XII: Guanajuato; Michoacán; Querétaro 
 
Source: Based on data form the Defense Secretary (Secretaría de la Defensa, SEDENA) 
The variables selected for weighting the regional military budgets during 
the period considered are well suited because: a) they show temporal and spatial 
variation, and b) they are closely related to the Drug War strategy initiated by 
Calderón. For example, if a region comprises two states, one in which DTOs 
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are highly active and one with little DTO activity, we can expect a higher share 
of the budget during the Drug War to be allocated to the state in which DTOs 
are more active. All four variables are reported by INEGI in its Anuario 
Estadístico y Geográfico por Entidad Federativa and are computed specifically for the 
‘Drug War’. However, they do not refer solely to the actions taken by the 
military, and include also the efforts of the navy as well as those of the federal 
and local police. To show some of the characteristics of these weighting 
variables, we report their descriptive statistics in Table A3.1 in the Appendix. 
Table 3.1 describes the variables used in our econometric specification 
of the model. Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics for these variables. 
The rates of kidnapping, extortion, property crimes and fraud include fewer 
observations because some states did not report occurrences in some years. 
 
Table 3.1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
GDP p.c. Logarithm of the real State GDP per capita (in $MXN 
of 2008) 
INEGI 
Physical Capital Stock of physical capital per capita by State (in 
logarithms) 
Germán-
Soto (2015) 
Human Capital Average years of schooling of the general population 
aged 15 and more per State (in logarithms) 
INEGI 
Population Growth Population growth rate in % CONAPO 
Financial Crisis Binary variable: 1 for the years 2008-2009; 0 otherwise - 
Homicides Homicides rate per 100,000 habitants (in logarithms) INEGI  
Kidnappings Kidnapping rate per 100,000 habitants (in logarithms) SNSP 
Extortions Extortion rate per 100,000 habitants (in logarithms) SNSP 
Car Robbery Car Robbery rate with and without violence per 
100,000 habitants (in logarithms) 
SNSP 
All Robbery Robbery rate per 100,000 habitants (in logarithms). 
This robbery rate includes all type of robbery 
SNSP 
Aggravated Rob. Aggravated robbery rate per 100,000 habitants (in 
logarithms) 
SNSP 
Property Crimes Property Crimes rate per 100,000 habitants (in 
logarithms) 
SNSP 
Fraud Fraud rate per 100,000 habitants (in logarithms) SNSP 
MB 
(Homicides) 
Military budget per capita (in $MXN of 2008) weighted 
by the number of homicides (in logarithms) 
PEF / 
INEGI 
MB 
(Detained People) 
Military budget per capita (in $MXN of 2008) weighted 
by the number of detained people during drug war 
operations (in logarithms) 
PEF / 
INEGI 
MB 
(Investigations) 
Military budget per capita (in $MXN of 2008) weighted 
by the number of investigations opened (in logarithms) 
PEF / 
INEGI 
MB (Seized 
Vehicles) 
Military budget per capita (in $MXN of 2008) weighted 
by the number of seized vehicles during drug war 
operations (in logarithms) 
PEF / 
INEGI 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Model 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Min. Max. Obs. 
Log of GDP p.c. 11.4737 0.5723 10.5101 13.9922 320 
Log of Physical Capital -2.9863 0.8156 -4.6369 -0.6614 320 
Log of Human Capital 2.1253 0.1110 1.7846 2.3780 320 
Population Growth Rate 0.0145 0.0072 -0.0020 0.0388 320 
Financial Crisis 0.2000 0.4006 0.0000 1.0000 320 
Log of Homicide Rate 2.3315 0.8578 0.5403 5.2048 320 
Log of Kidnapping Rate -0.6922 1.1867 -3.9120 3.6014 284 
Log of Extortion Rate 1.2401 1.0675 -2.9957 3.5888 263 
Log of Car Robbery 4.4647 1.0642 0.7696 7.0108 320 
Log of All Robbery 6.1015 0.7147 3.8497 7.7904 320 
Log of Aggravated Robbery 4.4099 1.0635 0.0091 7.1547 320 
Log of Property Crimes 5.2891 0.7036 2.4360 6.5503 319 
Log of Fraud 3.8444 0.8208 -1.4819 5.021314 318 
Log of MB (Homicides) 19.6775 1.2100 16.8678 23.3175 320 
Log of MB (Detained People) 19.6575 1.2211 15.8109 23.3908 320 
Log of MB (Investigations) 19.6900 1.1514 17.1934 23.4032 320 
Log of MB (Seized Vehicles) 19.7143 1.2000 16.1260 23.1624 320 
 
 
6. Results 
The results of our policy analysis of the ‘Mexican Drug War’ are reported in 
Table 3.3. Here, various econometric specifications are presented: first, to 
generate some intuition about the variables, we introduce a restricted version of 
the model using a fixed effects estimation (columns 1-4). This specification is 
common for regions for which physical capital and human capital variables are 
unavailable. Then, we refine the accuracy of our estimates by introducing 
physical and human capital stocks (columns 2-4). In column 2 we introduce the 
homicide rate provided by INEGI as a proxy for violence and in column 3 we 
use the homicide rate weighted by the military budget. Column 4 includes both 
these variables.  
As mentioned, equations 1-4 are estimated with fixed effects so as to 
generate some intuition and to show our variables of interest have a certain level 
of robustness. However, fixed effects regressions are biased because they do 
not account for the dynamic nature of the model. Neglecting to do so leads to 
consistency issues as described in detail by Nickell (1981). To overcome this, we 
use the difference-GMM panel data specification developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) in columns 5-8. This method takes into account the dynamic nature 
of the lagged dependent variable, by differentiating with one-period lagged 
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values correcting for the bias. Because of this, the estimation reports 288 
observations instead of 320. 
Table 3.3: Estimation Results (Dep. variable: Log of GDP p.c.) 
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From the performance statistics provided at the bottom of Table 3.3, we 
can see that the GMM estimations fit the model well because the chi2-statistic 
of the Wald test strongly rejects (at the 1% level) the null hypothesis of the joint 
statistical insignificance of the covariates. Due to the inclusion of the lagged 
value of the dependent variable as a covariate (which is highly significant in the 
fixed effects estimations), first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors is expected. We then reject the existence of second-order serial 
correlation in the first- differenced errors. With these results for the different 
tests we can affirm that our model is correctly specified and that the moment 
conditions are valid. 
Difference-GMM panel data estimations rely on a series of lagged 
variables that are then differenced and used as instruments. The Hansen test 
checks that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. The inclusion of all 
possible instruments in a small sample size would result in too many over-
identifying restrictions and consequently the specification would perform 
poorly. To overcome this, we restrict the number of instruments in each 
equation so that the Hansen over-identification test is not rejected. 
In all our estimations, we use the same dependent variable: i.e. the 
logarithm of real state GDP per capita. The logarithm of the lagged value of 
GDP per capita (interpreted as the initial level) is positive and highly significant 
for all specifications. Bearing in mind that 𝛽1 = −(1 − 𝑒
−𝛽0𝑇), the results are 
intuitive and in line with economic theory. Richer economies tend to have low 
GDP growth rates while poorer economies tend to have higher rates.  
The variable for the per capita physical capital stock performs well, being 
positive and highly significant. For the human capital variable proxied by 
average schooling years, the coefficient is significant and negative. This negative 
sign is found in other studies that undertake panel data analyses in an augmented 
Solow Model framework (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Islam, 1995), and is 
attributed to a lack of variability in the education averages once jurisdiction-
specific heterogeneity (state-specific fixed effects) is accounted for. 
The 2008-2009 financial crisis had a marked impact on Mexican states. 
As expected, the estimates are negative and highly significant for all 
specifications. The descriptive map (Figure A3.3 in the Appendix) shows that 
in 2008 signs of the crisis began to emerge, but that it was not until 2009 that 
all 32 states reported negative growth rates in their per capita output. Hence, 
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the magnitude and the negative sign of the coefficient of this two-year dummy 
seems reasonable.  
In the approach reported here, we measure growth in the homicide rate, 
i.e., we focus on the flow but not on the stock of homicides. We obtain negative 
and highly significant coefficients. A negative sign is clearly intuitive if we 
consider the wave of violence affecting Mexico to be a deterrent to the states’ 
economic performance. Thus, not only do drug-related homicides seem to 
affect state economic growth, but the increase in violence in terms of homicides 
seems to have negative and highly significant marginal effects. 
Our results for this DTO-associated crime variable are in line with results 
in Enamorado et al. (2014) for the drug-related homicide rate (measured in 
levels). The coefficients indicate a negative association with state GDP per 
capita. In Pan et al. (2012), the aggregate crime variable has a positive and 
significant sign, resulting from the fact that their variable is an aggregation of 
crimes which may have opposite signs.   
Here, the military budget weighted by the number of homicides in each 
state is positive and highly significant for the full model specification reported 
in column 8. In keeping with our claim that the weighted military budget should 
be a good indicator of where the Drug War strategy was implemented most 
intensely, this positive association indicates that military spending had a positive 
effect on state GDP per capita growth. 
To address potential issues of reverse causation, we check for the 
possibility that states with high growth rates demand or receive greater military 
intervention. To do this, we focus on the correlations of our variables (Table 
A3.2 in the Appendix) and the auxiliary difference-GMM regression between 
the growth rate of state GDP per capita and the weighted military budget 
options. From this analysis, we find that the correlations are minimal while the 
regression indicates no significant effects. The results of this auxiliary regression 
can be found in Table A3.3 in the Appendix.  
 
6.1 Weighting Alternatives for Military Expenditure 
Weighted military expenditure is our main variable of interest. For this reason, 
we consider it both pertinent and necessary to show that the budget is robust 
to different ways of weighting it. Thus, we tested additional weight variables 
associated with the fight waged by the Mexican military against DTOs.  
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In the category of crimes catalogued as crimes against society, the 
number of detentions is specifically related to “crimes against health”, including 
such crimes as drug trafficking, terrorist acts, human organ trafficking and 
trafficking of other illegal products. Here, INEGI reports the number of people 
detained during such crimes and the number of vehicles seized. Additionally, it 
is evident that most criminal investigations (per capita) are conducted in those 
states that are being disputed by DTOs. We chose investigations because it is 
often the case that the authorities initiate inquiries into shootings between 
DTOs or they find mass graves in a DTO territory. 
 
Table 3.4: Estimation with alternative weight variables for state level military 
expenditure (Dep. variable: Log of GDP p.c.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable: Log of GDP p.c. 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
Difference 
GMM 
     
Log of GDP p.c. (t-1) 0.707*** 0.405*** 0.393*** 0.608*** 
 (0.149) (0.0523) (0.0455) (0.0918) 
Log of Physical Capital 0.410*** 0.241*** 0.270*** 0.225*** 
 (0.0646) (0.0274) (0.0343) (0.0462) 
Log of Human Capital -1.357*** 0.373*** 0.457*** -0.177 
 (0.276) (0.144) (0.122) (0.243) 
Population Growth Rate -0.428 2.878* 3.049*** 0.969 
 (3.110) (1.518) (0.843) (2.323) 
Financial Crisis -0.0631*** -0.0534*** -0.0542*** -0.0666*** 
 (0.0149) (0.00584) (0.00454) (0.00925) 
Log of Homicide Rate -0.0390*** -0.00925*** -0.00551*** -0.0156* 
 (0.0111) (0.00233) (0.00182) (0.00880) 
Log of MB (Homicides) 0.0762***    
 (0.0204)    
Log of MB (Detained People)  0.0109***   
  (0.00301)   
Log of MB (Investigations)   0.00503**  
   (0.00208)  
Log of MB (Seized Vehicles)    0.0215*** 
        (0.00660) 
Observations 288 288 288 288 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Chi2 of the Wald-Test 1,527*** 46,175*** 107,492*** 2,463*** 
AR(1) -3.493*** -3.746*** -3.414*** -3.896*** 
AR(2) 1.624 1.211 0.501 1.146 
Hansen Test p-value 0.283 0.958 0.977 0.151 
Note: MB stands for the military budget weighted by the indicator in parentheses. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The results in Table 3.4 show that the estimates are positive, highly 
significant, and range from 0.0109 to 0.0762. Recall that caution is needed when 
interpreting the magnitude of this variable, because it is a state approximation 
for data that are available only at regional level.  
The results for these variables present the opposite sign to that reported 
by Enamorado et al. (2014) and Pan et al. (2012). However, in their models, the 
public expenditure variables are overly generic, since they target neither the 
improvement in public security, in general, nor the fight against DTOs, in 
particular. 
The war waged against DTOs is unlike any other. While typical wars 
target strategic physical assets such as transport, energy and communication 
infrastructure, a drug war is waged differently. Ongoing military operations to 
fight drug criminals bring with them the need for increased government 
spending, especially to sponsor field operations conducted by military troops 
(mainly infantry). Thus, rather than facing the widespread destruction of 
physical assets, the drug war results in increased government expenditure. The 
extraordinarily high level of military spending by Mexican standards is positively 
associated with the growth rate of real state per capita GDP.8 Mexico presents 
an annual average increase of 8.33% between 2006 and 2012 in its real military 
expenditure, which is much higher than that recorded in the other major 
countries (population > 20M) of Latin America: Brazil (5.24%), Colombia 
(4.92%), Argentina (2.10%), Peru (5.87%) and Venezuela (6.31%) [Data taken 
from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)].   
 
6.2 Robustness of Violence 
To show the robustness of our estimates for the violence variable, we present 
the estimation results obtained when using alternative proxies for crime and 
violence. These include rates of kidnapping, extortion, car robbery, overall 
robbery, aggravated robbery, property crimes and fraud. These criminal 
activities are often associated with the diversification of DTOs (Rios, 2008; 
Shirk, 2012; Calderón et al., 2015). The results are presented in Table 3.5.  
                                                          
8   It is logical to believe that the drug lords will have increased their expenditure on arms, 
vehicles, personnel (sicarios), and other means to fight increasing government action, thus 
boosting demand in a state’s economy. However, for obvious reasons, we cannot empirically 
address this assumption. 
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Comparing the estimates of the violence proxies, we see that all 
coefficients present a similar magnitude and are highly significant. Hence, our 
results are in line with the findings (also negative and significant) reported by 
Enamorado et al. (2014) for drug-related homicides. 
Table 3.5: Estimation with different variables describing violence in Mexican 
States (Dep. variable: Log of GDP p.c.) 
 
 
Note: Weighted MB is the military budget weighted by the number of homicides. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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6.3 Spatial Effects 
Although most actions undertaken by the states to fight DTOs (i.e. operations 
conducted by local and state police) are limited by individual state jurisdictions, 
military action and drug trafficking activities are not. For this reason, we study 
the existence of spatial effects in neighboring states. Table A3.4 in the Appendix 
shows the results of the estimation output for the spatial model. The signs of 
the coefficients are consistent with those obtained in the difference- GMM 
model described above. Likewise, the coefficients of the approximated state 
military spending are positive and in almost all cases highly significant. Thus, 
our weighted military budget approximation is robust to the inclusion of a 
spatial component. Finally, all the crime variables used here are negative; 
however, not all remain significant.9 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the Mexican government’s policy in its fight against 
DTOs and drug-related violence. Moreover, it has studied the effects of this 
policy on state GDP per capita using a panel data GMM model developed 
within the theoretical framework of regional convergence.  
We focus our attention on the effects of the policy implemented by the 
government to fight DTOs as approximated by state-level military spending. As 
only regional military budgets are available, we propose a state-level 
approximation of the military budget. We detect two different effects of the 
‘Drug War’ policy on economic growth: on the one hand, the escalation in 
violence since the adoption of the ‘Drug War’ strategy has resulted in significant 
negative effects on economic growth, regardless of the crime variable employed; 
on the other hand, military expenditure at state level presents a positive and 
significant effect on state economic growth. Our results indicate that an increase 
of 1 percentage point in the military budget (weighted by the number of people 
detained) is associated with an increase of 0.011 to 0.076 percent in the state 
GDP per capita growth rate. 
                                                          
9 The coefficient for the spatial variable (the W-matrix multiplied by the spatially lagged value 
of state GDP p.c. included in the model) is positive and significant. We perform a standard 
test to ensure that the spatial coefficient is different from zero. Based on the significance of 
the values reported in the table, we reject the hypothesis of the spatial coefficient ρ1 being 
equal to 0. 
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DTOs constitute a serious problem for Mexico, and for other countries 
on the continent. However, the war waged against these criminal organizations 
is having several unintended and unforeseen consequences, with particular 
effects on economic activity. While we have analyzed some of these effects 
during president Calderón’s administration, much more research is needed if we 
are to gain a better understanding of the problem and of how to address it. To 
conduct this research, the Mexican authorities need to make more and better 
data available to researchers, so that different dimensions of this complex public 
policy problem can be better analyzed.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Theoretical Framework  
 
We work with a regional economy growth model, where in region 𝑖 during time 
𝑡 the economy uses labor (𝐿𝑖𝑡), physical (𝐾𝑖𝑡) and human (𝐻𝑖𝑡) capital stocks, as 
well as the state of technology (𝐴𝑖𝑡) to produce its output (𝑌𝑖𝑡). In addition, we 
introduce an output deterrent variable (𝑍𝑖𝑡), which in our context will be a 
violence function 𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑉𝑖𝑡 , 𝑆𝑖𝑡) ≤ 1, with 𝑉𝑖𝑡 being the loss due to violence 
in our economy and 𝑆𝑖𝑡 is some form of State intervention to fight the levels of 
violence. If  𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 1, our economy is not affected by violence problems. On the 
other hand, if  𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 0, our economy will not be able to function properly. The 
average labor productivity (𝑦𝑖𝑡) is a function of the average levels of physical 
and human capital stocks: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝛽
 (1) 
 
where 𝛼 > 0 and 𝛽 > 0 are the internal rates of return for physical and human 
capital stocks respectively. We also assume that 𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1. Technology is 
assumed to grow exogenously and equally for all economies. The spillovers of 
neighboring economies are defined by 𝛾, which is the spillover intensity. If 𝛾 =
0, neighboring economies do not affect our incumbent economy, while if 𝛾 =
1, our economy will be affected for good or for worse. When the neighboring 
economies are bigger than the incumbent is, the influence is likely to be higher. 
For simplicity, we assume all economies to have the same influence on their 
neighbors. The factors 𝑘𝜌𝑖𝑡 and ℎ𝜌𝑖𝑡 are the per capita ratios of physical, and 
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human capital. 𝑍𝜌𝑖𝑡 denotes the violence function affecting the neighboring 
economies.  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡∆𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝛽(𝑍𝜌𝑖𝑡𝑘𝜌𝑖𝑡
𝛼ℎ𝜌𝑖𝑡
𝛽)𝛾 (2) 
With these neighboring effects, when physical and human capital 
increase, the rate of return will be (𝛼 + 𝛽)(1 + 𝛾). The spillover effects grow 
as the returns to capital and human capital grow. Consequently, the growth rate 
of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 can be expressed as 
𝑔𝑦 = 𝑔𝑍 + 𝛼𝑔𝑘 + 𝛽𝑔ℎ + 𝛾(𝑔𝜌𝑍 + 𝛼𝑔𝜌𝑘 + 𝛽𝑔𝜌ℎ) (3) 
 
B. Spatial Analysis 
 
To justify the inclusion of the spatial component in the model, i.e. if one region 
shows an influence of neighboring regions, we run the Global Moran’s I test, 
the Global Geary’s C test, the Global Getis and Ord’s G test and the Pesaran 
test for cross-sectional dependency. They all reject the null hypothesis of 
absence of spatial autocorrelation, such that we can confirm the presence of 
spatial dependency. To determine the type of spatial dependency, we run the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests as well as further Wald tests and conclude that 
the spatial component is given by a spatial lag of the dependent variable. This 
leaves us with a Spatial Lag Model. 
The spatial component is introduced by a 𝑊-matrix which is a binary 
contiguity weight matrix which is then multiplied with to state GDP per capita 
in surrounding states (𝑦𝑗𝑡) to the incumbent. The elements of the 𝑊-matrix are 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1 when two states share a common border and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise. This 
matrix is then standardized as is the usual case in the literature, such that the 
sum of each row of the matrix equals to 1.  
The results of the spatial analysis can be found in Table A3.4.  
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Figure A3.1: Evolution of the Military and Navy budgets, 2000-2013
 
Source: Based on data from PEF.  
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Figure A3.2: Cumulated growth rate of the real military budget 
for all military regions for the period 2006-2012 
         
Note: The horizontal line marks the average growth rate of all military regions 
(152%) during the period. Source: Based on data from PEF.  
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Figure A3.3: Real GDP per capita growth rates, 2004-2013
        
Source: Based on data from INEGI and CONAPO.  
Essays on Public Policies in Mexico: Pollution, Employment and Drug Crime 
________________________________________________________________________ 
83 
 
 
Table A3.1: Descriptive Statistics of the weight variables for the Military 
Budget 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs 
      
Homicides 544.8531 726.9028 21 6421 320 
Detained People 892.3875 1313.887 5 9483 320 
Previous Investigations 4534.222 6037.466 491 37025 320 
Seized Vehicles 413.6062 667.4658 1 4563 320 
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Table A3.2: Correlation Matrix 
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Table A3.3: Auxiliary estimation using difference GMM (Dependent variable: 
weighted Military Budget) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep variable: Log of 
weighted MB 
Log of MB 
(Homicides) 
Log of MB  
(Detained People) 
Log of MB 
(Investigations) 
Log of MB 
(Seized Vehicles) 
          
Log of GDP p.c.  -3.391 3.122 -4.618 4.892 
 (2.552) (4.956) (3.808) (7.092) 
Log of GDP p.c. (t-1) 2.597 1.942 -6.650 3.914 
 (2.866) (9.428) (4.135) (7.989) 
Log of GDP p.c. (t-2) 0.955 -3.134 10.18* -6.524 
 (2.548) (8.076) (5.268) (8.910) 
          
Observations 256 256 256 256 
Number of States 32 32 32 32 
Chi2 of the Wald test 8.219** 0.447 5.421 0.906 
AR(1)  -0.920 -0.633 2.272** -1.081 
AR(2)  0.787 1.819* 0.337 0.977 
Hansen Test p-value 0.816 0.368 0.243 0.298 
Note: MB is the military budget weighted by the number of homicides. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A3.4: Results for the Spatial autoregressive difference GMM panel data 
estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. variable: 
Log of GDP p.c. 
SAR  
Difference GMM 
SAR  
Difference GMM 
SAR  
Difference GMM 
        
Log of GDP p.c. (t-1) 0.544*** 0.532*** 0.537*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0331) (0.0331) 
Log of Physical Capital 0.235*** 0.242*** 0.242*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0215) 
Log of Human Capital -0.0139 -0.109* -0.0955 
 (0.0613) (0.0636) (0.0665) 
Population Growth  1.541* 1.601* 1.411* 
 (0.839) (0.831) (0.829) 
Financial Crisis -0.0313*** -0.0306*** -0.0305*** 
 (0.00367) (0.00366) (0.00369) 
Log of Homicide  -0.000587  -0.00351 
 (0.00360)  (0.00419) 
Log of MB  0.00855* 0.0111** 
  (0.00458) (0.00545) 
W * Log of GDP p.c. (i-1) 0.244*** 0.246*** 0.231*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0359) (0.0377) 
        
Observations 288 288 288 
States 32 32 32 
Chi2 of the Wald test 1766.9*** 1841.2*** 1826.8*** 
Note: MB is the military budget weighted by the number of homicides. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Effects on employment of reducing minimum wage areas 
in a developing country with high informality 
 
 
 
Abstract 
At the end of 2012, in an effort to increase the value of the country’s real 
minimum wages, which had eroded over the preceding decades, the Mexican 
government reformed its minimum wage territorial policy and reduced the 
previous three minimum wage areas to two. The minimum wage in the area that 
disappeared was increased to be on a par with that fixed for the area with the 
highest minimum wage. It is the effects of this natural experiment that this study 
analyzes. The results from the differences-in-differences analysis show that the 
increase in the minimum wage in these territories resulted in a reduction in 
employment, above all among male workers employed in the formal labor 
market. The impact on the number of informal workers was not significant.  
 
 
Keywords:    Minimum Wage; Employment; Informality; Mexico 
 
JEL Codes:   J08, J21, J46 
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1. Introduction 
Minimum wages have been in place for decades in many countries of the 
western world. Yet, the consensus about the impact of minimum wages and 
minimum wage increases was broken in the mid-1990s when Card and Krueger 
(1994) reported finding no employment effects following a minimum wage 
update. Since this first study, a large body of empirical literature has emerged 
questioning the effects long attributed to minimum wages by economic theory.  
Decision makers are particularly cautious about the impact of the 
minimum wage. The caution (or even open refusal) expressed by governments 
to increase the minimum wage significantly above inflation appears to be based 
on the fear of the possible consequences of such an action on employment, 
poverty, productivity, informal labor, wage distribution, etc. 
In developing countries, minimum wages, which are supposed to 
guarantee the most basic living standard, are sometimes too low to acquire the 
minimum basket of goods. The case of various Latin American countries is 
notorious in this regard. During much of the late twentieth century, when many 
of these countries suffered high inflation, more than one government chose to 
reduce minimum wages in real terms, in attempt, among other things, to bring 
inflation under control.  
Many studies have analyzed the effects of minimum wages, typically 
focusing on the impact of their introduction or increase on inflation and 
employment. In determining their effect on prices, Lemos (2008), in an 
evaluation of thirty empirical studies, calculates that a 10% minimum wage 
increase raises overall prices by 0.4% in the US and by less than 0.3% in Brazil. 
In the case of Colombia, Lasso-Valderrama (2010) estimates a price increase of 
0.6% following a 10% increase of minimum wages.  
Many empirical analyses of the impact on employment have been 
undertaken in the wake of Card and Krueger’s (1994) seminal study. The debate 
has been ongoing for more than two decades, but there is little consensus as to 
whether minimum wage increases have negative effects on employment or not, 
and if so, which segment of the labor force is affected. Most of these studies 
have focused primarily on the situation in developed countries, that is, the US 
and Europe, while the number of studies focusing on Latin American countries 
is small. Yet, given the heterogeneity of labor markets and economic structures 
across countries it would not be surprising if developing economies did not 
present more marked results than those presented by developed countries. 
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Figure 4.1 compares the relationship between minimum wages and GDP 
per capita of OECD countries and a few non-OECD countries. Latin American 
countries appear in the lower left area of this figure, with Mexico at the very 
bottom in terms of real minimum wages per hour and below the level predicted 
by the simple regression line. 
 
Figure 4.1: Comparison of real Minimum Wages per hour and real GDP per 
capita across countries, wages in 2015 US Dollars at PPPs  
 
Source: Based on data from the OECD 
 
With an average real GDP growth rate of 2.84% since 1990, Mexico is 
the second largest economy in Latin America (after Brazil). Inflation in the 
country was brought under control following the 1995 Peso crisis and since 
2000 Mexico has reported one-digit annual inflation rates. For this reason, it is 
somewhat surprising that Mexico has one of the lowest minimum wages, not 
only among OECD countries, but also among Latin American countries (see 
Figure 4.2).  
Mexico, in common with other Latin American countries, has a large 
informal labor market, estimated at 50-60% of the working population. This 
makes it difficult to anticipate just how a minimum wage increase would affect 
both formal and informal employment.  
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Figure 4.2: Real minimum wages per hour in 2015 for selected countries, 
wages in 2015 US Dollars at PPPs 
Source: Based on data from the OECD 
 
Since the early 2000s, civil society, worker unions, and even some 
business sectors have been lobbying strongly to increase minimum wages. In 
Mexico, some 6.4 million people10, or 13.1% of the working population, earn 
up to one minimum wage or less. The government of Mexico City has proposed 
increasing the minimum wage to a rate that is 15.7% above inflation until the 
real minimum wage level recovers the value it had in the 1980s. Pressure to 
increase wages has also comes from outside Mexican borders. During the 2017 
NAFTA renegotiation talks, Canada and the US pushed Mexico to increase 
(minimum) wages arguing that Mexico keeps wages low in order to attract 
investment that values low labor costs.  
While some countries operate a national minimum wage, others 
introduce a territorial differentiation at the sub-national level, e.g. in the US, the 
States can set minimum wages that are higher than the federal minimum. In 
Mexico, a differentiation is made based on living standards across the nation, 
with the country being divided into minimum wage areas. Until 2012, three such 
areas were in operation; however, following a policy change in that year, they 
                                                          
10 Campos-Vázquez (2016) reports 6.46 million people earning up to one minimum wage, 
11.99 million earning between one and two minimum wages, and 11.09 million earning 
between two and three minimum wages (Data from the Mexican labor force survey ENOE, 
first quarter of 2014) 
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were reduced to just two. Such policy changes are rare events, but present an 
excellent opportunity to analyze how economic variables react to minimum 
wage changes. 
This study therefore examines the effect of a minimum wage increase on 
employment in Mexico. The contributions of this study can be simply stated: 1) 
using causal techniques, evidence is found that minimum wage increases have 
negative effects on employment and, more specifically, on formal employment; 
2) by drawing a distinction between formal and informal labor markets, the 
analysis is able to determine the labor force movement between the formal and 
informal sectors of employment after a minimum wage increase; 3) gender 
differences are found for the impact of minimum wages, with male workers 
being more affected than female workers; 4) given the negative impact of the 
policy on employment, and in line with theoretical considerations, the Mexican 
labor market for low-wage workers is closer to a scenario of perfect competition 
than one of monopsony. 
 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Background 
2.1 Theory 
The effects of minimum wage policies have been analyzed exhaustively over the 
years. Various theoretical models have emerged that seek to explain the 
mechanics linking labor supply and labor demand, and the resulting effects on 
wages and employment when the minimum wage is raised. Most models can be 
grouped in one of three categories: a) that of perfect competition, b) that of 
monopsony, in which a single company demands all labor available in the labor 
market, and c) that of monopsonistic competition, a situation that lies between 
these two extreme scenarios.  
In recent decades, the monopsony and monopsonistic competition 
models have found greater acceptance among researchers due to their closer 
resemblance to reality. The extreme monopsony model assumes the presence 
of a sole company that concentrates all market power and which maximizes its 
profits when its marginal costs equal the marginal productivity of labor. Since 
the model assumes that workers have no choice regarding their workplace, the 
company sets salaries below the equilibrium level provided by the model of 
perfect competition. In this scenario, an increase in the minimum wage level 
could lead to an increase in employment since the profit-maximizing company 
might absorb the wage increase and keep its demand for workers unchanged. It 
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might even be the case, albeit unlikely, that the monopsonist takes on more 
workers to produce more and so offset the increased labor costs.11   
Monopsonistic competition provides for the existence of several 
companies demanding labor, allowing oligopsonies to emerge. These 
oligopsonies pay wages between the monopsony wage and the perfect 
competition wage. By increasing the number of companies in a market, 
conditions converge towards the perfect competition scenario. When increasing 
the minimum wage, employment can either increase (when the market 
approaches a monopsony), decrease (when the market approaches perfect 
competition) or remain ambiguous. However, if the minimum wage increase is 
considerable and close to the companies’ marginal cost, it may force some 
companies to exit the market. 
Various studies, including Bhaskar et al. (2002), have criticized policy 
decisions based on the neoclassical model on the grounds that perfect 
competition is a rather rare scenario and wages can vary significantly even within 
short distances. 
Based on the predictions of these models and the results of the empirical 
analysis reported below, this study is able to pin down which scenario best fits 
the Mexican labor market, thus providing policy makers with more information 
about the labor market.   
 
2.2 Methodology for Analyzing Minimum Wages and Employment 
The controversy concerning the effects of minimum wages on employment and 
just how these effects should be analyzed is by no means new. The debate first 
ignited in the 1990s following the publication of Card and Krueger’s (1994) 
study, which, contrary to theoretical predictions and previous empirical studies, 
found no significant effects of a minimum wage increase in the fast food 
industry on employment numbers. Their experimental approach based on the 
use of treatment and control groups to analyze minimum wages rapidly spread 
and many studies have subsequently tried to find causal evidence to support 
their findings. Studies that analyze the fast food industry following the 
experimental approach developed by Card and Krueger include Dube et al. 
(2007), Hoffman and Trace (2009), and Dube et al. (2010). These causal studies 
focus on low-wage workers in the fast food sector and involve a refinement of 
                                                          
11 See Boeri and Van Ours (2008) for a more detailed description of such a case. 
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Card and Krueger’s original approach. While Hoffman and Trace (2009) find 
significant negative effects, Dube et al. (2007, 2010) do not. One aspect Dube 
et al. (2010) deem it important to control for is state-specific labor market 
trends. 
County-specific labor trends are examined in Addison et al. (2015), who 
report very low minimum-wage elasticities. While in their extensive comparison 
of minimum wages and related institutions across the European Union, Arpaia 
et al. (2017) include country-specific employment trends and find that minimum 
wages have negative but non-significant effects on employment.  
A different strand of the literature has focused its attention on the use of 
models with fixed effects as opposed to market trends. Neumark and Wascher 
(1992) control for state-level fixed effects and estimate that a minimum wage 
increase of 10% reduced employment among young workers by 1.5-2.0%. 
Neumark and Wascher (1998, 2000) and Neumark (2001) refined the approach 
and included individual fixed effects. Later, Neumark and Wascher (2007) 
carried out an analysis of 102 minimum wage studies finding negative effects on 
low-wage workers. Dube et al. (2016) use a regression discontinuity design and 
claim that given their empirical design local trends are meaningless.  
In the debate concerning the most appropriate methodology for 
analyzing minimum wage effects, Meer and West (2015) and Neumark et al. 
(2014) are critical of most studies that employ state-specific time trends. They 
claim that in so doing the authors have “thrown out so much useful and 
potentially valid identifying information that their estimates are uninformative 
or invalid” (Neumark et al., 2014, p. 644). 
In this longstanding discussion on how best to analyze minimum wage 
policies, several authors have tried to combine approaches. For instance, 
Allegretto et al. (2011) include both fixed effects and state-specific labor market 
trends. They find very little to no effect on employment numbers.  
Another possible method that allows both approaches to be combined 
involves using a dynamic model. Dolton et al. (2015) employ such a model to 
analyze the impact of the national minimum wage in the UK and find no 
discernible effects on employment. A recent study finding small effects is 
Allegretto et al. (2017). They estimate their model using first differences, which 
is similar to a dynamic approach. Dube and Zipperer (2015) find no reduction 
in employment effects and highlight the relevance of lagged effects, especially, 
in minimum wage studies. 
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2.3 Minimum Wages and Employment in Mexico 
Although this study specifically analyzes the effects of minimum wage increases 
in Mexico, it is clearly beneficial to be able to compare the outcomes with 
countries presenting similar labor market characteristics (in terms, that is, of 
their informal labor market, low minimum wages, etc.).  
In common with other countries in the region, Brazil has a sizeable share 
of its working population operating in the informal labor market (45-55%). 
Lemos (2004), in a review of the existing literature, reports that a 10% increase 
in the Brazilian minimum wage would lead to a decrease in the employment 
figures of up to 5%. For Colombia, Bell (1997) reports that a 10% increase in 
the minimum wage level reduced the employment of low-wage workers by 2 to 
12%.  
To the best of my knowledge, the effects of minimum wage increases on 
employment in Mexico have been examined primarily in three studies. First, Bell 
(1997), in undertaking a regression analysis of firm-level data from large 
manufacturing firms, while controlling for fixed effects, is unable to find any 
significant employment effects after minimum wage increases. Second, 
Feliciano (1998) analyses the employment-to-population ratios between 1970 
and 1990 using regional minimum wages and finds that large minimum wage 
reductions increased the employment of female workers but reduced the 
employment of males aged 55 to 64. Minimum wages did not affect the 
employment levels of young males, while for females the study reported 
negative effects. Third, Campos-Vázquez et al. (2015) analyze the effects of 
minimum wage increases following the reduction of the minimum wage area in 
2012. The authors focus primarily on individual wages, but they also analyze 
employment levels. More specifically, their study uses an experimental design to 
estimate the extent to which the probability of being employed was affected by 
the minimum wage area reduction. Their results show negative but non-
significant effects of the minimum wage increase on the probability of being 
employed.  
This last study is particularly relevant to the case dealt with herein, as it 
analyzes the effects of the same policy. However, a key difference between the 
two studies is that here the approach adopted considers the aggregate number 
of employed people in municipalities, estimating the effect of the policy on the 
number of employed people while distinguishing between formal and informal 
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workers. In contrast, Campos-Vázquez et al. (2015) use data at the individual 
level and specifically estimate the probability of being employed. 
Campos-Vázquez et al. (2015) are able to observe individuals only for 
two periods (one prior to the introduction of the policy and one after). To verify 
the robustness of their outcomes, the authors check different panels made up 
from different individuals; however, their results are not consistent across these 
panels in terms of significance or even, on occasions, of sign. In this paper, the 
study takes municipalities as its measure of observation, which have the 
advantage of being easy to follow over time. The municipalities assigned to 
treatment and control groups are followed over eight periods (quarters) prior to 
the introduction of the policy and eight after. 
Two key labor market characteristics that Campos-Vázquez et al (2015) 
do not account for are economic conditions and specific labor market dynamics. 
Here, by using a dynamic panel, and by means of the robustness tests presented 
in section 6, the approach adopted is able to account for these characteristics, 
resulting in a robust estimation of the policy’s impact on employment. 
Thus, in short, this study contributes to the literature by analyzing 
employment numbers after a minimum wage increase, while considering labor 
market dynamics and aggregate economic conditions. The analysis is further 
enhanced by the distinction that it draws between formal and informal labor 
markets, allowing us to determine which group of workers are affected most. It 
also allows us to identify whether the workers that lost their jobs because of the 
policy moved out of the formal labor market and entered the informal market. 
 
3. Institutional Framework 
A minimum wage was officially introduced in Mexico in 1934. After lengthy 
institutional developments, a national commission – the Mexican Minimum 
Wage Commission (Comisión Nacional de Salarios Mínimos, CONASAMI) – was 
made responsible for determining changes to the minimum wage in 1987. This 
decentralized, public institution determines all modifications to the minimum 
wage, taking into consideration economic well-being and the country’s broader 
social environment. In theory, its decisions aim to foster equality and justice 
between the factors of production (that is, capital and labor).12 
                                                          
12 Own translation from the CONASAMI website <http://www.conasami.gob.mx/ > 
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CONASAMI updates minimum wage levels once a year (in December), 
thus allowing economic actors to anticipate the increases. However, the 
commission can, at its discretion, modify the minimum wages during the year, 
should economic conditions call for such an intervention. Although CONSAMI 
does not expressly disclose the mechanism applied in updating minimum wages, 
the increases are discussed with business and labor representatives. Despite this, 
minimum wage updates appear to have adhered to criteria related to inflation 
expectations, similar to the mechanisms employed in countries such as Belgium, 
France, and the Netherlands. Having said that, during the period 1990-2010, 
minimum wage increases were consistently below the inflation rate. Only 
recently has the institution announced minimum wage increases above inflation. 
 
4. Policy 
Until November 2012, Mexico operated three distinct minimum wage areas, 
which depended on where people worked (areas A, B or C). Workers in areas 
considered to have higher living costs (food, transport, housing, etc.), e.g. 
Mexico-City, were categorized into area A, earning a higher minimum wage than 
workers employed in minimum wage areas B and C. 
On November 23rd, 2012, CONASAMI announced that minimum wage 
area B was to disappear, its wage being placed on a par with that in area A. This 
change meant an increase, from one quarter to another, of 4.5% in real terms 
(or 6.9% in nominal terms) for area B, while the other two minimum wage areas 
(A and C) experienced a real increase of 2.5% (a nominal increase of 3.9%). 
Minimum wage area B includes a number of municipalities in the following 
states only: Jalisco, Nuevo León, Sonora, Tamaulipas and Veracruz. The 
evolution of nominal and real minimum wages is shown in Figure 4.3. 
At the same time, the federal government acknowledged the informal 
labor problem and decided to implement various programs to reduce informal 
labor, including the Employment Formalization Program (Programa para la 
formalización del empleo), the launch of Unemployment Insurance, and a Universal 
Pensions Program in 2016 (see ILO, 2014, 2015). However, these programs 
were all launched after the modification to the minimum wage area, which 
means they should not affect the analysis presented in this study. 
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of minimum wages by area in Mexico for the period 
2010-2014, wages in Mexican pesos 
Source: Based on data from CONASAMI and INEGI. 
 
5. Empirical Strategy and Methodology 
The panel data used for this analysis is unbalanced. Due to the absence of a 
randomized trial, a natural experiment is analyzed using a differences-in-
differences methodology, which has been widely used to estimate the impact of 
policy interventions. The econometric specification is the following: 
𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑙𝑁𝑖𝑡−𝑙
𝐿
𝑙=1
+ 𝜇𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑁𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of employment measures. In applying this model, the 
number of employed people in each municipality are used (differentiating 
between males and females). Furthermore, a distinction is drawn between those 
working in the formal labor market and those identified as working in the 
informal sector of the economy. The variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the binary vector 
indicating the policy intervention.  
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The inclusion of lags of the dependent variable allows for the inclusion 
of labor dynamics. This is relevant because one labor market can have particular 
characteristics that other labor markets do not share. It also controls for specific 
labor trends that might characterize certain municipalities (for example, there 
may be regions that have especially high or low employment figures). In 
addition, the model includes municipality specific effects to control for 
unobservable municipality characteristics that are constant over time. These 
municipality fixed effects control for a possible correlation with the policy 
change linked to the minimum wage (Card and Krueger, 1995; Brown, 1999). 
The matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains several explanatory variables, including the 
economically active population. It also includes the Kaitz index, i.e. the ratio 
between minimum wages and average wages, as is common in the literature 
(Broecke and Vandeweyer, 2015; Dolton et al., 2015; Arpaia et al., 2017). The 
model also controls for the average number of years of schooling of the general 
population aged above fifteen in order to proxy the level of education in each 
municipality, which is denoted by the variable 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡. Furthermore, population 
density is included in the matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑡 to control for possible agglomeration 
effects. The model includes a constant term (𝛼), municipality fixed effects (𝜃𝑖) 
and time fixed effects (𝛿𝑡). Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the stochastic error term. 
The variable of interest in this differences-in-differences analysis is 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡. This binary dummy is associated with the coefficient 𝛾. This policy 
coefficient measures the difference between the average change experienced by 
the minimum wage in area B (treatment group) and the average change 
experienced in areas A and B (control group). When using differences-in-
differences, the coefficient 𝛾 is defined as follows:  
𝛾 = [𝐸(𝑁𝐵|𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐴|𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 1)] 
− [𝐸(𝑁𝐵|𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 0)  −  𝐸(𝑁𝐴|𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 0)] 
(2) 
where 𝑁𝐵 and 𝑁𝐴 denote the employment variable before and after the merger 
of the two minimum wage areas. 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 1 and 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 = 0 denote treatment 
and control group conditions respectively. 
Since minimum wage area B was only present in a certain fraction of 
Mexican states, the study is centered on just four states: Jalisco, Nuevo León, 
Sonora, and Tamaulipas. The state of Veracruz is not included because too few 
of its municipalities are assigned to area B. Therefore, the treatment group is 
defined as those municipalities within these four states that were part of 
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minimum wage area B, while the control group is defined as those municipalities 
within these four states that do not belong to minimum wage area B. Selecting 
treatment and control groups from the same state has the advantage that 
municipalities share the same institutional framework. A map of the 
municipalities making up each group can be found in Figure A4.1 in the 
Appendix. 
Satisfying the parallel-trend assumption, which is central for the 
differences-in-differences analysis, ensures that the temporal trends of the 
treated and control groups are indeed parallel prior to the policy intervention. 
The satisfaction of this condition is essential to guarantee that the measured 
impact is unbiased. Figures A4.3-A4.5 in the Appendix present graphical 
evidence of the satisfaction of the parallel trend assumption.13 A helpful 
characteristic of the differences-in-differences methodology highlighted in 
Bertrand et al. (2004) is that the method considers potential endogeneity 
problems that might bias the impact. Related to this, an additional assumption 
is that unobservable characteristics of the municipalities remain constant over 
time. 
Using the dynamic model specification described in (1), the model 
accounts for time-specific effects while considering the trend of employment 
numbers in the different municipalities. The importance of controlling for labor 
dynamics is derived from the fact that “large negative elasticities in the 
traditional specification are generated primarily by regional and local differences 
in employment trends that are unrelated to minimum wage policies” (Dube et 
al., 2010, p. 962). Other studies that specifically addressing this question are Page 
et al. (2005), Lemos (2009), Addison et al. (2013), and Arpaia et al. (2017). 
 
6. Data Sources and Construction of Samples 
For the analysis of minimum wages in Mexico, the data used in this study are 
taken from Mexico’s labor force survey, Encuesta Nacional de Empleo y Ocupación 
(ENOE), for the period 2010-2014. The ENOE is a household survey that 
follows a rotating panel design. It is conducted all year long and is answered by 
over 120,260 households each quarter. The microdata extracted from this 
survey include employment characteristics, including wages, as well as 
information on whether the person is employed in the formal or in the informal 
                                                          
13 The numerical test can also be provided upon request. 
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sectors of the economy. A technical limitation of this survey is the inability to 
follow subjects over time. This study circumvents this limitation by aggregating 
respondent numbers for each municipality, and then using these municipalities 
as units of observation that can be followed over time. 
Employed people are defined by the Mexican Statistics Institute 
(INEGI) as people with a minimum age of 15 that carry out at least one hour 
of labor per week. This category includes workers who have a job but were 
unable to perform it during the reference week, as well as people that were 
absent from the workplace but who continue to have a working relationship 
with their employer. Unpaid work is also included in this category. Informal 
workers are those people working for an economic unit that is not formally 
registered as a society or an enterprise.  
Although the ENOE survey is representative at both state and national 
levels, not all municipalities have a representative number of respondents in the 
survey. In many cases, the population of a municipality is small and the survey 
is answered by few respondents. This means many municipalities have survey 
respondent numbers that cannot be considered representative. For this reason, 
only those municipalities that consistently present a representative number of 
survey respondents over time are included. The others are excluded (see Figure 
A4.2 in the Appendix).  
Further data are taken from the ENOE survey, including the 
economically active population and the average number of years of education 
of the population aged 15 and above. Average wages by municipality are also 
computed from the data in the survey in order to construct the Kaitz index. 
To complement these employment data, information not contained in 
the survey is added, including population density (also provided by INEGI). For 
the robustness specifications presented in section 6.1, the quarterly state 
economic activity index (ITAEE) is included to serve as a proxy for state-level 
GDP. The real exchange rate, calculated as weighted averages of bilateral 
exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices, is also included as a control. 
These data are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. As a final 
control, the model uses the 28-day equilibrium interest rate between banks to 
reflect market conditions affecting financial institutions and the external sector.  
Table 4.1 describes the variables used in the econometric specification 
of the model, whereas Table 4.2 presents the respective descriptive statistics for 
the variables employed. 
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Table 4.1: Description of Variables included in the Model 
Variable Description Source 
Employed 
Logarithm of the number of all employed workers aged 15-
65 (by sex) 
ENOE 
Formal 
Employed 
Logarithm of the number of employed workers aged 15-65 
laboring in the formal labor market 
ENOE 
Informal 
Employed 
Logarithm of the number of employed workers aged 15-65 
laboring in the informal labor market 
ENOE 
Policy 
Binary variable: 1 if the period is after December 2012 and 
the municipality belongs to the treatment group; 0 otherwise 
CONSAMI 
Econ. Active 
Pop. (EAP) 
Logarithm of the economically active population (by sex) ENOE 
Kaitz Index 
Logarithm of the Kaitz index: ratio between minimal wages 
and average wages for workers aged 15-65 (by sex) 
ENOE 
Education 
Logarithm of average years of schooling of the general 
population aged above fifteen in each municipality (by sex) 
ENOE 
Density 
Logarithm of the population density: population divided by 
the municipality area 
CONAPO/ 
INEGI 
State Econ. 
Activity 
Logarithm of the quarterly state economic activity index 
(ITAEE) 
INEGI 
Exchange Rate 
Logarithm of the real exchange rate (2010=100) of Mexican 
Pesos and US Dollars 
FED 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables (Variables before Logs) 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. Obs. 
Employed 180,441 154,025 6,580 793,230 473 
Employed (Females) 70,832 64,018 1,645 351,380 473 
Employed (Males) 109,610 90,473 4,935 455,205 473 
Emp. Formal 102,628 90,059 1,143 432,590 473 
Emp. Formal (Females) 37,599 35,655 235 185,535 473 
Emp. Formal (Males) 65,029 55,020 381 253,874 473 
Emp. Informal 77,813 66,291 3,614 363,073 473 
Emp. Informal (Females) 33,233 29,254 834 166,354 473 
Emp. Informal (Males) 44,580 37,300 2,585 202,144 473 
Policy 0.2791 0.4490 0 1 473 
Econ. Active Pop. 192,034 162,942 7,050 836,866 473 
Econ. Active Pop. (Females) 75,689 67,688 1,946 367,135 473 
Econ. Active Pop. (Males) 116,344 95,715 4,935 479,772 473 
Kaitz Index 0.3570 0.0588 0.1527 0.5367 473 
Kaitz Index (Females) 0.4216 0.0826 0.1284 0.7180 473 
Kaitz Index (Males) 0.3295 0.0570 0.1453 0.5702 473 
Education 4.2106 0.1320 3.8310 4.6875 473 
Education (Females) 4.2427 0.1449 3.7517 4.7201 473 
Education (Males) 4.1780 0.1710 3.6629 4.9048 473 
Density 1464.50 2208.59 11.88 7992.92 473 
State Economic Activity 109.930 7.326 98.236 130.820 473 
Real Exchange Rate 99.674 3.506 91.703 104.157 473 
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7. Results 
The benchmark model measuring the impact of the policy includes, as 
explanatory variables, the lags of the dependent variable, the economically active 
population, the Kaitz index, the level of education, and the population density. 
The estimations are run for all workers, and then separately for males and 
females.  
Table 4.3 presents the results for all workers in employment regardless 
of whether they work in the economy’s formal or informal sectors. Column 1 
shows the results for all workers regardless of sex, while columns 2 and 3 present 
the results for female and male workers, respectively. The impact of the larger 
minimum wage increase in Area B had different effects depending on the group 
of workers considered. Compared to the control group, treated municipalities 
experienced a 2% increase in real minimum wages, which significantly reduced 
the number of male workers by 2.07%, while the number of female workers was 
unaffected (the policy coefficient is negative but non-significant). If we consider 
the effect of the policy on all workers, the policy reduced the number of workers 
by 1.1%.  
Some of the lags of the dependent variable are highly significant. This 
supports the inclusion of lags and confirms the existence of labor market 
dynamics. Furthermore, both the economically active population and the Kaitz 
index have positive and highly significant effects. Level of education does not 
have any effect on employment in this table and population density is significant 
for female and male workers but not for the two combined.  
The Chi2-statistic of the Wald-Test allows us to state that the models in 
their different specifications are well fitted since the test statistic in each case 
strongly rejects the null-hypothesis of the joint statistical insignificance of the 
covariates. First order autocorrelation is significant, which is expected, given the 
dynamic construction of the model. By not being able to reject the null-
hypothesis of the second-order autocorrelation test, it can be affirmed that the 
models are correctly specified and that the moment conditions are valid. Lastly, 
the null-hypothesis of the Hansen over-identification test cannot be rejected 
either, which indicates that the models do not suffer any problems of 
overidentification. The combined statistics reported at the bottom of the table 
indicate that the use of the GMM model is correct. 
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Table 4.3: Difference GMM estimation results for the Mexican labor market 
(Dep. Variable: Logarithm of the number of employed workers) 
Dep. Variable: Log of  
Employed 
(1) (2) (3) 
All Females Males 
        
Policy -0.0110*** -0.00954 -0.0207*** 
 (0.00340) (0.00861) (0.00727) 
Log of Employed (t-1) 0.0156** -0.00421 0.0408** 
 (0.00703) (0.0122) (0.0193) 
Log of Employed (t-2) 0.0225*** -0.0228* 0.0738*** 
 (0.00752) (0.0119) (0.0183) 
Log of Employed (t-3) 0.0299** 0.0806*** -0.0609** 
 (0.0118) (0.0141) (0.0262) 
Log of Employed (t-4) 0.000358 0.0269 -0.0330** 
 (0.0120) (0.0229) (0.0162) 
Log of Econ. Active Pop. 0.985*** 1.004*** 0.983*** 
 (0.00603) (0.00926) (0.00737) 
Log of Kaitz Index 0.0806*** 0.0434*** 0.0911** 
 (0.0156) (0.0107) (0.0375) 
Log of Education (t-1) -0.00251 -0.0399 0.00324 
 (0.0412) (0.0556) (0.113) 
Log of Density (t-1) -0.0307 -0.406** 0.398* 
 (0.171) (0.204) (0.222) 
        
Observations 430 430 430 
Number of Municipalities 30 30 30 
Municipality FE YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Chi2 of the Wald-Test 260,554*** 645,649*** 5.934e+06*** 
AR(1) -3.606*** -2.649*** -2.966*** 
AR(2) -1.275 -0.988 -0.191 
Hansen Test p-value 0.960 0.996 0.971 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The estimation in Table 4.4 presents the results for the impact of the 
policy considering only the workers employed in the formal sector. The 
coefficient of the policy variable is greater than in the previous specification, 
with a more negative effect on the number of all workers (not differentiated by 
sex). The implementation of the minimum wage policy reduced the number of 
all workers in the formal sector by 4.18% (significant at 10%) and more 
significantly the number of male workers by 4.8%. The number of female 
workers does not present a significant reduction as a result of the policy.  
The economically active population and the Kaitz index are again 
positive and significant, while years of education and population density are not. 
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Once again, the test statistics at the bottom indicate the correct use of the 
difference GMM method. 
Table 4.4: Difference GMM estimation results for the formal labor market 
(Dep. Variable: Logarithm of the number of employed workers in the formal 
labor market) 
Dep. Variable: Log of  
Formal Employed 
(1) (2) (3) 
All Females Males 
        
Policy -0.0418* -0.0187 -0.0482** 
 (0.0230) (0.0399) (0.0202) 
Log of Formal Employed (t-1) -0.0254 0.128*** -0.0137 
 (0.0293) (0.0487) (0.0302) 
Log of Formal Employed (t-2) 0.000343 -0.0439 0.119*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0801) (0.0266) 
Log of Formal Employed (t-3) -0.0392 0.0920** -0.192** 
 (0.0443) (0.0419) (0.0867) 
Log of Formal Employed (t-4) 0.111*** 0.274*** -0.0579 
 (0.0213) (0.0632) (0.0557) 
Log of Econ. Active Pop. 1.099*** 1.024*** 1.094*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0351) (0.0513) 
Log of Kaitz Index 0.619*** 0.127* 0.361** 
 (0.102) (0.0721) (0.147) 
Log of Education (t-1) 0.375 -0.236 0.0479 
 (0.446) (0.260) (0.264) 
Log of Density (t-1) -0.274 -1.017 0.838 
 (0.650) (0.698) (0.951) 
        
Observations 430 430 430 
Number of Municipalities 30 30 30 
Municipality FE YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Chi2 of the Wald-Test 21,413*** 12,403*** 11,907*** 
AR(1) -1.859* -2.432** -1.636 
AR(2) 0.760 1.088 1.058 
Hansen Test p-value 0.953 0.808 0.999 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
In accordance with the International Labor Organization, the Mexican 
Statistics Institute defines informal workers as those people working in places, 
firms or companies that are not properly registered. This number also includes 
workers not receiving any social security benefits, people that work for 
themselves in agriculture at subsistence levels and workers who are not paid at 
all.  
The analysis of the informal labor market, presented in Table 4.5, shows 
no significant effect of the merger of the minimum wage areas. However, the 
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signs of the coefficients are positive. Considering the results for the formal 
market, a positive though non-significant effect for the policy coefficient in the 
informal market would be reasonable. However, the number of workers 
crossing over from the formal to the informal sector was not high enough to 
increase the number of informal workers significantly.  
Despite this, interestingly, most covariates that were significant for 
overall employment and for formal employment are not significant for the 
informal labor market. The Kaitz index might not be significant because 
informal workers are not bound by minimum wage regulations. Education levels 
of informal workers are often below those of formal workers. Moreover, it is 
possible that the lower education levels of workers in this sector do not undergo 
much variation in time and space, so that the coefficients remain non-
significant. 
Table 4.5: Difference GMM estimation results for the informal labor market 
(Dep. Variable: Logarithm of the number of employed workers in the informal 
labor market) 
Dep. Variable: Log of  
Informal Employed 
(1) (2) (3) 
All Females Males 
Policy -0.00537 0.00565 -0.00113 
 (0.0299) (0.0750) (0.0450) 
Log of Informal Employed (t-1) -0.0774** -0.166 -0.121 
 (0.0353) (0.107) (0.0757) 
Log of Informal Employed (t-2) 0.0720 0.0201 -0.0753 
 (0.0460) (0.0567) (0.0922) 
Log of Informal Employed (t-3) 0.00446 0.0209 -0.114 
 (0.0443) (0.187) (0.0725) 
Log of Informal Employed (t-4) -0.247*** -0.158 0.00475 
 (0.0612) (0.152) (0.0973) 
Log of Econ. Active Pop. 0.960*** 1.045*** 0.956*** 
 (0.0326) (0.113) (0.0647) 
Log of Kaitz Index 0.0258 0.121 -0.222** 
 (0.119) (0.273) (0.0873) 
Log of Education (t-1) 0.539 0.293 0.523 
 (1.113) (1.392) (0.747) 
Log of Density (t-1) -1.179* -1.964* -0.953 
 (0.619) (1.181) (1.499) 
Observations 430 430 430 
Number of Municipalities 30 30 30 
Municipality FE YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Chi2 of the Wald-Test 25,827*** 555.7*** 901.9*** 
AR(1) -2.290** -1.047 -2.097** 
AR(2) -1.174 -0.902 -0.0403 
Hansen Test p-value 0.492 0.344 0.994 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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7.1 Robustness: Effects beyond Municipalities 
Municipalities are seldom immune to events taking place at the state level. Thus, 
a municipality that experiences an economic shock – be it positive or negative 
– is likely to have an impact on it neighboring municipalities, especially if they 
belong to the same local labor area. Moreover, while institutions may vary 
significantly across states, they rarely differ across the municipalities within the 
same state. 
To account for these factors and to demonstrate the robustness of the 
reported effects of the minimum wage policy on employment, the state 
economic activity index is added to the control variables. This index captures 
the effects of economic expansion and contraction on the municipalities within 
the same state.  
Table 4.6 presents the results of the three employment panels when 
including the state economic activity index. The policy, which is our variable of 
interest, remains unchanged in terms of its sign, significance and magnitude for 
overall employment, formal employment and informal employment. The overall 
effect of the policy on employment is a reduction of 1.01% and a 3.71% cut in 
formal employment. The impact on the informal labor sector remains non-
significant.  
Broadening the spectrum of possible external effects affecting labor 
markets in the treated municipalities, macroeconomic effects are considered. 
These effects do not only impact the municipalities and states considered here 
but also the entire country. In an additional attempt to demonstrate the 
robustness of the previous estimates, the real exchange rate between the 
Mexican Peso and the US Dollar is included in Table 4.7. This variable should 
model the interaction with Mexico’s main trading partner, the US, as well shocks 
that affect the entire Mexican economy. 
The results of the policy intervention follow the same pattern as with the 
previous case, although the effects are slightly larger. The negative coefficient 
for the policy variable rose from 0.0101 to 0.0122 for the panel including all 
workers. For formal workers, the policy’s negative effect increased from 0.0371 
to 0.0459. Informal labor continues to be positive and statistically non-
significant. As such, the real exchange rate seems to have no impact on 
employment for any of the groups considered during the period of analysis. 
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Table 4.6: Difference GMM estimation results including the indicator for state 
economic activity (Dep. Variable: Logarithm of the number of employed 
workers) 
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Table 4.7: Difference GMM estimation results including macroeconomic 
effects (Dep. Variable: Logarithm of the number of employed workers) 
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8. Conclusions 
This study presents an impact evaluation of the minimum wage policy 
introduced in Mexico at the end of 2012. By using a differences-in-differences 
approach, the natural experiment is exploited by analyzing the change in 
employment figures in the formal as well as in the informal labor markets in the 
four Mexican states affected by the policy. 
The causal evidence obtained from the analysis indicates that minimum 
wages have small, negative effects on employment, especially, in the case of male 
employment. By distinguishing between formal and informal labor markets, 
those working in the formal market are identified as the group of workers most 
strongly affected by the policy. The results also suggest that those workers that 
lost their jobs as a result of the policy may have moved from the formal sector 
to the informal sector of employment. These results are line with the findings 
in the studies of Khamis (2013), Grau and Landerretche (2011) and Ham (2018), 
all of which employ differences-in-differences to study the effects of minimum 
wage increases on employment in Latin American countries. 
As this study has shown, small minimum wage updates can have a 
significant effect on employment numbers. Results show that the policy, which 
represented a real increase in minimum wages of 2.0% for the treated 
municipalities, resulted in an overall reduction in employment of 1% for all 
workers and a more marked reduction of 2.0% for male workers. Female 
workers were not affected by the policy.  
When distinguishing between formal and informal workers, results show 
that the policy resulted in a 4.1% reduction in the employment of formal 
workers, with male workers being affected more strongly, suffering a reduction 
of 4.8%. The policy did not have a significant effect on the number of female 
workers employed in the formal sector. Likewise, workers in the informal labor 
market did not experience a significant impact of the policy.  
Overall, therefore, we can state that a moderate increase (2%) in real 
minimum wages in Mexico, which employers are unable to anticipate, will 
negatively impact the number of male workers but not the number of female 
workers, and the number of formal workers will be reduced. A minimum wage 
increase of this dimension will not affect the number of informal workers. 
Readers should be careful when extrapolating the impact of such 
increases due to the potential nonlinearities of minimum wage increases. 
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However, we can safely assume that a 1% increase in the real minimum wage 
will result in a 0.5% reduction in employment numbers.   
Based on the results obtained from this policy evaluation, the Mexican 
labor market resembles a market in perfect competition. This classification 
particularly applies to low-wage male workers in the states of Jalisco, Nuevo 
León, Sonora, and Tamaulipas. 
The quasi-experimental evidence presented in this study should not 
discourage policy makers in Latin American countries from updating minimum 
wages, but it should serve to make them aware of the consequences of such 
increases. Minimum wage increases should, it appears, be followed up with 
policies that counter their effects on employment. It is to be hoped that future 
research will be able to find more natural experiments in the region, so that 
regional differences across the countries of Latin America can be highlighted. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure A4.1: Map of the Mexican municipalities eligible to be selected into 
treatment and control groups 
           
Source: underlying map from CONABIO. Own coloring and group selection. 
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Figure A4.2: Map of the municipalities from treatment and control groups 
with a representative number of survey respondents 
        
Source: underlying map from CONABIO. Own coloring and group selection. 
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Figure A4.3: Parallel trends of treatment and control groups for all groups of 
workers 
               
Source: Based on data from ENOE. 
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Figure A4.4: Parallel trends of treatment and control groups for formal 
workers 
               
Source: Based on data from ENOE. 
Essays on Public Policies in Mexico: Pollution, Employment and Drug Crime 
________________________________________________________________________ 
119 
 
Figure A4.5: Parallel trends of treatment and control groups for informal 
workers 
               
Source: Based on data from ENOE. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
1. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Public policy evaluation can serve different purposes: a) to identify whether a 
government program is achieving its desired goal; b) to quantify the impact on 
other variables or indicators; c) to inform the policy maker about unintended 
effects caused by the policy; or d) to determine its efficiency for achieving a 
particular target compared to alternative policies. Armed with this information, 
policy makers can expand successful policies, improve those that fell short of 
their desired targets, and replace a policy with another if the intervention proves 
ineffective or even worse if it has unintended negative effects.  
The purposes of the evaluations reported in this thesis differ for each of 
the policies. In chapter two, the impact of BRT implementation in Mexico City 
is analyzed with respect to the specific target established before the intervention. 
This target was to reduce congestion and with it to reduce air pollutants. In 
chapter three, the Drug War policy initiated in December 2006 is assessed. Here 
the target was clearly not to impact the states’ economic growth, but rather to 
dismantle drug trafficking organizations and to apprehend criminals, something 
that local police forces had been unable to do. The unfortunate repercussion of 
this intervention was an increase in homicides and other crimes, including 
kidnappings, extortions, robberies, etc. In chapter four, the change in the 
minimum wage territorial policy presented a natural experiment which provides 
useful information regarding the effects of minimum wages on employment in 
Mexico.   
The introduction of the BRT meant more than simply substituting old 
buses with newer vehicles. The policy also reduced the number of traffic lanes, 
enforced the use of bus stops, and changed people’s behavior by encouraging 
some commuters to switch from their private vehicles to public transport. The 
aggregate effect of these changes reduced CO, NOx and PM10 levels in areas 
close to the BRT corridor in Mexico City. Knowledge of the fact that the 
introduction of BRT cut emissions and reduced the concentrations of pollutants 
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should encourage the local government to expand the network of BRT routes. 
The outcomes should also be of interest for cities with similar geographical and 
traffic features to those of Mexico City.  
The assessment of Mexico’s Drug War policy and how it affected 
economic growth went beyond a simple consideration of homicide and crime 
rates, and introduced a key component into the analysis: namely, the effect of 
the public expenditure shock represented by the increase in military spending. 
While the violence variables had a sufficiently large effect to have a significant 
and negative impact on state economic growth, military expenditure showed a 
positive effect. These outcomes – recording significant signs – give some idea 
of the scale of the problem created by DTOs in Mexico. However, the policy 
analysis undertaken is not able to offer policy recommendations in terms of 
what the policy maker might have done differently. If there is one thing that the 
fight between government forces and DTOs has shown, it is that the structure 
of the drug cartels does not depend on the role played by single individuals. The 
detention of these drug lords gave rein to more violence as battles broke out 
among those seeking to replace them. Moreover, there are indications that the 
DTOs have diversified their operations beyond drug trafficking. The 
confrontational strategy adopted by the government to date has done little to 
check the operations of the DTOs.  
The decision by Mexico’s minimum wage commission to unify minimum 
wage areas in the country provides an opportunity to analyze how real minimum 
wage increases affect employment in a country with high levels of informality. 
The 2% increase in minimum wages reduced employment by 1%. This result 
gives policy makers insights into the effect such an increase is likely to have on 
employment, allowing them to anticipate this reduction and implement a jobs 
program to counterbalance the effect. Furthermore, it also shows policy makers 
that increasing minimum wages moderately will not augment the number of 
workers employed in the informal sector of the economy. 
To summarize, the cases analyzed in this thesis have covered three public 
policies of great current relevance to Mexico. Although the research reported 
here focuses on the country of Mexico, the insights drawn from the different 
analyses should be helpful not only to Mexican policy makers but also to 
governments from other developing countries with similar characteristics to 
Mexico. Moreover, the methodologies employed here should allow for 
replication in other countries.  
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2. Limitations and Future Research 
Empirical studies often seek to find real-world evidence of the predictions and 
behaviors described in theoretical work. However, a common obstacle to doing 
that is the availability of data. Regardless of data limitations in terms of data 
quality and availability, the reader should not lose sight of the fact that empirical 
models are never more than an abstraction of reality aimed at capturing a 
simplified version of events. As such the chapters that make up this thesis 
present certain limitations.  
In chapter two the availability of data is certainly a shortcoming. The 
model would be considerably enhanced if traffic data were available. However, 
the government of Mexico City has no infrastructure in place to count the 
number of cars crossing the city. Moreover, the analysis undertaken in this 
chapter centers on mean concentrations of pollutants. Future research needs to 
explore how the policy impacted pollutant concentrations along the different 
parts of the distribution using quantile regression techniques. For this chapter, 
daily data were used; however, it would be interesting to obtain higher frequency 
data so as to be able to incorporate the daily pollution cycles (i.e. peak pollution 
hours) into the analysis.   
Chapter three, which includes data on the budget allocation of the 
Mexican military, also suffers a number of shortcomings related to these data. 
Obtaining data about the military, navy and federal police from the Mexican 
government is far from easy. When seeking specific information, most requests 
were rejected on the grounds of “national security concerns”, which is perhaps 
understandable. An additional difficulty is the inability to attribute a specific 
illicit activity to a particular drug trafficking organization. Having this 
information would improve the analysis significantly.  
Chapter four is limited by the representativity of the Mexican labor force 
survey conducted at the municipal level. New data have become increasingly 
available and perhaps in the future administrative data will also be made 
available. A similar merger of minimum wage areas took place recently; 
however, full data are not yet available. It would be interesting to replicate the 
analysis with the more recent policy. In addition, this natural experiment could 
also be exploited to explore the inflation effects of minimum wage increases. 
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3. The future of policy evaluations in Mexico 
Institutions that evaluate public policies are necessary to hold government 
officials accountable for their expenditure. By further institutionalizing the 
evaluation of government interventions, blinds spots in the policy making 
process will be easier to detect, and government policies will become more 
effective and more efficient.  
While policy evaluations can be undertaken in Mexico today thanks to 
the data that are available, the country is making important steps towards 
strengthening its institutions with responsibility for conducting such 
evaluations. The creation of CONEVAL has made more information available 
and increased transparency in the social policy field. But greater efforts and 
more funding are needed to expand the scope of analyses, not only into other 
fields of public policy, but also at the subnational level so as to foster a stronger 
evaluation culture.  
It is to be hope that the upward trend recorded in the number of policy 
evaluations will continue and become more pronounced in the future and that 
public policy evaluations will become an integral part of the policy making 
process in Mexico ensuring the enhancement of people’s welfare. 
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